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ARTICLES
NEGLECTING NATIONALISM
Gil Seinfeld*
ABSTRACT
Federalism is a system of government that calls for the division of power between a central authority and member
states. It is designed to secure benefits that flow from centralization and from devolution, as well as benefits that
accrue from a simultaneous commitment to both. A student of modern American federalism, however, might have
a very different impression, for significant swaths of the case law and scholarly commentary on the subject neglect
the centralizing, nationalist side of the federal balance. This claim may come as a surprise, since it is obviously
the case that our national government has become immensely powerful over the course of United States history, to
the point that it is difficult to identify areas of human activity that the national government cannot regulate. But
the social and doctrinal developments that helped to usher in the empowerment of our national government have
not been accompanied by the development of a constitutional theory of federalism that takes nationalism properly
into account. To the contrary, nationalism is routinely treated as something external to our constitutional
federalism or, indeed, something antagonistic to it. Informed observers, both on the courts and in the academy,
often write as if federalism and devolution were synonymous, and as if our federal system were designed to capture
only the benefits associated with state empowerment. The textual foundations for, and functional goals associated
with, the nationalist side of the enterprise are infrequently discussed and seriously undertheorized, and, as a result,
nationalism’s role in our federal scheme is poorly understood. This Article endeavors to document our neglect of
nationalism, to consider its causes, and to speculate about its consequences.
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INTRODUCTION
If you ask the average law student—or lawyer, or judge, or legal
scholar—for a quick account of what “federalism” is, you are likely to get
“states’ rights” (or something very much like it) as an answer. Federalism,
most would say, means a commitment to devolution; it is about state
autonomy, and it is about local control. It is a scheme of government that
frowns on excessive empowerment of a central authority and includes
protections to guard against national overreach. This conception of
federalism appears frequently in our case law, it is echoed in scholarly
commentary, and it is taught in our law schools. It is among the most
conventional of conventions in our legal culture. And it is wrong.
I suspect that, on just a moment’s reflection—and despite the way we
tend to talk about it—most every informed observer would agree: Federalism
and devolution are not the same thing; the former is an accommodation
between the latter and the instinct to centralize. To be sure, federalism
entails a commitment to states’ rights, but no more, necessarily, than it entails
a commitment to national empowerment. Thus, the standard usage of the
term “federalism”—in both our legal and political discourse—is misleading.
It neglects the nationalist side of our constitutional order, thus ignoring half
of what makes federal systems federal.
This is no mere terminological tic. Rather, it reflects an approach toward
our federalism that drives reasoning and argument across a range of cases
and scholarly work. In other words, this way of using the term “federalism”
reflects a way of thinking about what federalism is—one that has real purchase
in our legal culture.
This claim must surely seem odd at first blush. Our national government
is now immensely powerful, and our history has been marked by a steady
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push—one that accelerated rapidly over the course of the twentieth
century—in the direction of centralization. Moreover, although many hold
the view that our Constitution, properly understood, does not confer a
general police power on the national government, most everyone also agrees
that prevailing doctrine enables the federal government to regulate virtually
any field of human activity. Thus, one could be forgiven for reacting
skeptically to the claim that our legal culture is neglectful of nationalism in
any meaningful way.
I have no wish to lose my audience to this skepticism before I have had a
chance even to begin, so I invite you to perform the following thought
experiment. Ask yourself, first, what values our federalism is designed to
serve. Then ask what sources you might turn to in support of your answer.
For those steeped in the relevant case law and academic commentary, the
answers roll off the tongue. Federalism can help to enhance individual liberty;
it provides opportunities for citizens to participate in governance; it carries the
promise of tailoring policies to accommodate the preferences of a diverse
citizenry; and it offers opportunities for policy experimentation with
diminished risk that the effects of a failed experiment will ripple nationwide.
The supportive sources are equally familiar, with Justice O’Connor’s majority
opinion in Gregory v. Ashcroft,1 Michael McConnell’s review essay Federalism:
Evaluating the Founders’ Design,2 and some others3 at the heart of the canon.
Despite the reflexiveness with which students of federalism could recite
this familiar litany, I think it clear, here too, that the litany is just wrong—or
perhaps, in this case, just seriously misleading. For this is an account of
benefits that might flow from devolution; and federalism, as noted above, is
about more.4 It is an arrangement that calls for empowering states and for
1

2
3

4

501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (“This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the people
numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized government that will be more sensitive to the
diverse needs of a heterogenous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement in
democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and experimentation in government; and it
makes government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile citizenry.”).
Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders’ Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1491–
1511 (1987) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS’ DESIGN (1987)).
E.g., DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 75–106 (1995); Deborah Jones Merritt, The
Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3–10 (1988);
Andrzej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process: The Jurisprudence of Federalism After Garcia, 1985 SUP.
CT. REV. 341, 351.
My point is different from the one about federalism and decentralization famously advanced by
Professors Feeley and Rubin. Feeley and Rubin contend that many of the benefits traditionally
associated with federalism might just as easily be secured (and, indeed, are probably better secured)
through a strategy of managerial decentralization imposed by a central planner. See MALCOLM M.
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empowering a central authority. Yet the benefits associated with the latter
are essentially excluded from the standard picture.5
This tendency to conflate federalism with devolution is an omnipresent
feature of our legal discourse. Indeed, once you become aware of the
practice, it becomes difficult to miss, as it appears time and again across a
wide range of sources. (I will point to many examples in this Article.) Even
so, it remains tempting to dismiss this observation as more a semantic quibble
than a truly substantive beef. For surely the judges and commentators who
present these familiar arguments are well aware that federal systems,
including our own, value both devolution and centralization. The
formulation may be imprecise—even sloppy—but that does not mean our
legal discourse neglects nationalism in a meaningful way.
Let us return, then, to our thought experiment and ask a parallel set of
questions about nationalism. What values do the centralizing, nationalist
features of our federal architecture serve? And what texts do informed
commentators treat as stock citations for the standard answers? Answering
the first question is more difficult than it should be; answering the second is
probably impossible.
On reflection, most of us would cite uniform regulation—the enactment
of national law in the interest of avoiding races to the bottom, externalities,
and the like—as one of the key virtues of political confederation.6 And we
might argue, too, that individual rights—especially those of racial, political,
and other minority groups—will be better protected in a larger polity
comprising overlapping interest groups with cross-cutting priorities and
commitments.7 But even if judges and commentators would converge on

5

6

7

FEELEY & EDWARD RUBIN, FEDERALISM: POLITICAL IDENTITY AND TRAGIC COMPROMISE 20–
29 (2008). I take no position here on whether Feeley and Rubin are right to argue that one does
not need “true federalism” (which they define as a system in which member states enjoy “definitive
rights against the center”) to secure the benefits in question. Id. at 20, 22. My point is just that,
even if these benefits are properly thought of as the benefits of “federalism,” they still represent only
half the picture.
Of the four benefits included in the standard list––protection of liberty, civic engagement, broader
satisfaction of policy preferences, and increased experimentation––the latter three plainly flow from
devolving power from a central authority to member states. Only the claim about the preservation
of individual liberty relates to the nationalist side of the picture, since the point is that simultaneously
empowering multiple levels of government carries the promise of animating a natural check against
abuse by any one. Benefits that might flow from nationalism alone are not mentioned.
See Abbe R. Gluck, Nationalism as the New Federalism (and Federalism as the New Nationalism): A
Complementary Account (and Some Challenges) to the Nationalist School, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1045, 1057
(2015) (noting that “nationalism seems associated mostly with a single value: uniformity”).
See SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 50–56. Commentators may be more attracted to this particular trope
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these accounts of the values served by political union, I think it
uncontroversial to say that the nationalist brief does not occupy a place in
our legal discourse that is anything like the one enjoyed by its devolutionary
counterpart.8 The particulars of the nationalist account do not leap to mind
as do the details of the standard (devolution-focused) model, and there simply
are not standard sources that serve as a convenient shorthand for the relevant
set of ideas.9
In these ways and others, nationalism is a neglected concept in our
constitutional discourse.
It is infrequently discussed and seriously
undertheorized, and its role in our scheme of constitutional federalism is
poorly understood.10 This Article is an effort to document this neglect,
consider its causes, and speculate about its consequences.
My analysis proceeds in three Parts. Part I focuses on a species of neglect
I label “denial.” It canvasses sources that either disregard or seriously
marginalize the nationalist features and aims of our federal system. Part II
focuses on what I call “complacency.” Complacency is reflected in the

8

9

10

than is warranted by the facts. See Richard A. Primus, Bolling Alone, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 975,
1007–09 (2004) (noting that “[e]xperience has not always vindicated th[e] view” that “an ‘extended
republic’ . . . is less likely to use governmental power against minority groups than individual state
governments are” (footnote omitted)).
See Gluck, supra note 6, at 1057 (“We have elaborated theories of ‘Our Federalism,’ but have no
theory of ‘Our Nationalism’ . . . .” (footnote omitted) (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–
45 (1971))).
The most fully developed account can be found in SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 34–57. Madison’s
Federalist No. 10, of course, famously expounds on the relationship between an extended republic
and the protection of political minorities. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 83–84 (James Madison)
(Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). The virtues of nationalism are also explored briefly in Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 405–09 (1997), and Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1499–1500 (1994).
There have been two relatively recent symposia—one published in the Yale Law Journal, the other
in the Saint Louis University Law Journal—developing what Dean Gerken has labeled the “nationalist
school of federalism.” See Heather K. Gerken, Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview, 123
YALE L.J. 1889, 1890 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Gerken, The New
Nationalism]; Heather K. Gerken, Federalism and Nationalism: Time for a Détente?, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J.
997, 997 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted) [hereinafter Gerken, Détente]. These scholarly
efforts do not undermine my claims that nationalism is “infrequently discussed,” “seriously
undertheorized,” and “poorly understood.” As one contributor to the latter symposium observed,
the term “nationalism,” as it is deployed in this body of work, is more of an empty label than a
concept with discernable content capable of aiding analysis. See Gluck, supra note 6, at 1056, 1059
(explaining that “what [members of this school] mean by ‘nationalism’ remains unclear,” as they
have not yet explained “how the ‘nationalism’ aspect of their account adds to or changes the stakes
of the benefits that we already understood to be generated by the states even acting outside of a
national framework”); id. at 1059 (“[I]t remains difficult for me to see, apart from the use of the new
label ‘nationalism’ instead of ‘federalism,’ how the prescription for good democracy [advanced by
the “new nationalists”] . . . is all that different from [a] traditional federalism account.”).
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instinct (made manifest in important pockets of scholarly literature) to
explore and celebrate different means of promoting state power—all in the
name of “good federalism”—while declining to consider the consequences of
such empowerment for national law, national policy, and national
institutions. Complacent commentary does not deny the nationalist
commitments of our federal system; it is simply unconcerned about them.
Part III offers some tentative thoughts about the consequences of this neglect.
I. DENIAL
In this Part, I examine sources that are in denial about the nationalism of
our constitutional order. It is denial of a particular sort. Thus, I am not
concerned (at least not here) with the modest shading or short-changing of
constitutional values that participants in legal discourse often feel is
characteristic of their adversaries’ position. (Though that, too, might
reasonably be characterized as a species of neglect.) It is not my goal to show
that courts and commentators sometimes take the interests in nationalism
and devolution, place them on opposite sides of the scale, and fail to get the
balance right. What I want to show, instead, is that, in discussions of
constitutional federalism, nationalism often does not make its way onto the
scale at all. It is not treated as part of the constitutional calculus, and, as a
result, a host of claims that should simply be unsayable in the context of
serious discourse about American federalism has made its way into the
mainstream, routinely unquestioned and unchallenged.
Section I.A documents this phenomenon as it appears in the judicial and
scholarly discourse relating to statutory interpretation in cases with
significant federalism implications. That discourse, we will see, is marked by
a series of errors and oddities sounding generally in a failure to give
nationalism its due. We will see (in connection with these materials and
others I explore later on) that authoritative sources routinely treat the term
“federalism” as if it were synonymous with “devolution” and proceed from
the apparent premise that while the expansion of national power might
threaten constitutional values, the curtailment or obstruction of that power
generally cannot. In so doing, these sources effectively erase the nationalist
side of our federal scheme.
Section I.B examines a distinct species of denial—one that focuses on
nationalist constitutional text. It explores sources that offer broadly-gauged
accounts of what the Constitution requires when it comes to the division of
power between the national government and the states, but that, in so doing,
either seriously marginalize or completely ignore foundational nationalist
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features of our Constitution. This commentary, we will see, treats several
constitutional provisions that have far-reaching implications for the
allocation of power between the federal government and the states (most
prominently the Fourteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Amendments) as if
they provided virtually no insight into the basic shape of our federal system.
A. The Presumption Against Preemption and Its Cousins: Neglect for Nationalism in the
Interpretation of Federal Statutes
Since the late 1940s, the Supreme Court has developed and deployed an
array of rules governing the interpretation of federal statutes in cases
implicating the balance of power between the federal government and the
states. These rules direct courts to eschew interpretations of federal law that
threaten significant intrusions on state power unless the evidence of
congressional intent so to intrude is especially compelling. Thus, the
Supreme Court has established a general presumption against federal
preemption of state law;11 it has directed courts to decline to enforce
conditions on states’ receipt of federal funds unless Congress has specified
those conditions “unambiguously” and “with a clear voice;”12 it has
determined that federal statutes ought not to be construed to abrogate state
sovereign immunity unless Congress has made its intent to do so
“unmistakably clear in the language of the statute;”13 and it has directed
courts to resist interpretations of federal law that authorize particularly
“intrusive” exercises of federal power—interpretations that would affect
“fundamental” features of state sovereignty—unless they are “absolutely
certain that Congress intended such an exercise.”14
The standard justification for these rules is straightforward: state
autonomy is an important constitutional value, and these interpretive devices
help to promote it. The rules aim to preserve the “substantial sovereign

11

12
13
14

Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (“[W]e start with the assumption that
the historic police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that [is]
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”). Whether this presumption is taken seriously is
subject to debate. See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Empowering States When It Matters: A Different
Approach to Preemption, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1313 (2004); Mary J. Davis, Unmasking the Presumption in
Favor of Preemption, 53 S.C. L. REV. 967 (2002).
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985).
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460, 464 (1991). For an overview of these “federalism canons,”
see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as
Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593, 607–08, 619–25 (1992).
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authority”15 of the states by assuring that courts do not “give the statedisplacing weight of federal law to mere congressional ambiguity.”16 At first
blush, this looks like fairly benign stuff. It is not uncommon for the Supreme
Court to craft rules of statutory interpretation with an eye to safeguarding
important constitutional values,17 and it seems uncontroversial to say that
state autonomy qualifies as such.18 Moreover, the presumption/clear
statement approach seems a relatively modest way to bolster state autonomy,
at least when compared to approaches that rely on the Supreme Court to
craft bright-line rules of constitutional law demarcating the outer limits of
congressional power.19 In theory, at least, these interpretive rules do nothing
to prevent an attentive Congress from advancing its vision of the proper
allocation of power between the federal government and the states.20 Thus,
one could be forgiven for presuming that the case law establishing and
developing these rules (together with the attendant scholarly commentary) is
an unlikely place in which to find aggressively tendentious thinking about the
contours of our federalism.
That turns out to be wrong. To see how and why this is so, I am going
to turn my attention to two sources: the Supreme Court’s frequently-cited
decision in Gregory v. Ashcroft, and the academic literature relating to the
presumption against preemption, especially the work of Professor Ernest
Young. Gregory contains the Court’s most sustained and oft-quoted effort to
defend the suite of interpretive practices outlined above, while Young is an
especially ardent defender of a robust presumption against federal
15
16

17
18
19

20

Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457.
Id. at 464 (emphasis omitted) (quoting LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 625 (2d ed. 1988)); see also Peter M. Shane, Federalism’s “Old Deal”: What’s Right and Wrong with Conservative
Judicial Activism, 45 VILL. L. REV. 201, 206–07 n.37 (2000) (explaining that these rules “instruct[ ]
Congress that state autonomy values are of sufficient importance that the Court will not infer that they
have been superseded absent evidence—in the form of a plain statutory statement—that Congress has
actually deliberated on the relevant state interests and the reasons for superseding them”).
See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 459 (1989).
But see FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 4 (arguing that federalism is vestigial in the modern United States).
See, e.g., Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 126 (2004)
(discussing the virtues of softer “resistance norms” as opposed to “invalidation norms”). But see
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 14, at 632–45 (exploring a range of concerns relating to the Court’s
deployment of federalism-based clear statement rules).
I say “in theory” because there is reason to doubt whether Congress is responsive to the Court’s
preemption decisions. See Note, New Evidence on the Presumption Against Preemption: An Empirical Study
of Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Preemption Decisions, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1604, 1605 (2007);
see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901, 942–46 (2013)
(presenting a mixed bag of evidence relating to statutory drafters’ familiarity with the federalism
canons and noting, in particular, that “[e]vidence of a feedback loop for clear statement rules . . .
was almost entirely absent”).
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preemption of state law. These sources defend the relevant interpretive
practices by reference to the purposes served by our establishment of a
federal system of government, but they are in denial when it comes to the
nationalist side of that system. More specifically, these sources either ignore
the nationalizing features and aims of our constitutional structure or reduce
them to an afterthought.
I should emphasize, at the outset, that despite what these sources say—
despite their persistent conflation of “federalism” and “devolution” and their
failure to treat nationalism as an active and important constitutional value—
I do not believe the courts and commentators whose work I survey here
would deny that nationalism is, in fact, an important (indeed, a definitional)
feature of any federal system. What these sources mean to communicate, I
think, is that the state-autonomy-promoting canons are attractive because
they represent our best hope, under a contingent set of conditions that
happen to obtain in the modern United States, for mediating between the
competing impulses that characterize federal schemes. But if that is right,
then the heart and soul of the argument—the account of what it is about
current conditions that makes it necessary to privilege the devolutionary
instinct over the centralizing one—is simply missing.21 It is neglectful of
nationalism no matter how you slice it.
1. “An Extraordinary Power”
Gregory v. Ashcroft presented the question of whether a provision of the
Missouri Constitution requiring state court judges to retire at age seventy
violated the federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act (the “ADEA”).22
The Court answered this question in the negative, reasoning that (a) absent
a clear statement from Congress, federal statutes ought not to be construed
21

22

In his article Making Federalism Doctrine, Professor Young readily acknowledges that “federalism”
refers to a system of government that calls for balance between the interests in centralization and
devolution. See Ernest A. Young, Making Federalism Doctrine: Fidelity, Institutional Competence, and
Compensating Adjustments, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1733, 1848–50 (2005). He takes pains to explain
why, under modern conditions, it is appropriate for courts to craft legal doctrine with an eye to
shoring up the devolutionary side of things. See id. at 1783–85. So, while we will see that much of
Professor Young’s work is neglectful in the ways detailed in this Part, some of it is emphatically not.
We will see in Section I.B, however, that the analysis underlying Professor Young’s conclusion that
our federal system has fallen out of balance is itself neglectful of nationalism, albeit in a way that is
different from the neglect reflected in the collapsing of federalism and devolution into one.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 455 (1991). The case also raised the question whether the
mandatory retirement age violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.
The Court said no. Id. at 470–73.
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to invade core aspects of state sovereignty, (b) the ADEA lacked such a clear
statement, and so (c) it should not be read to apply to state laws that set
qualifications for state judges.23
The Court grounded its analysis in a series of grand claims about the
design of our federal system. First, it explained that our Constitution
establishes a system of dual sovereignty pursuant to which states enjoy
“separate and independent autonomy”24 and powers that are “numerous
and indefinite.”25 It then emphasized that the preservation of state power
and autonomy is essential to securing the myriad benefits associated with the
adoption of a federal system, foremost among which is the protection for
individual liberty that flows from having two independent and “credible”
levels of government ready and able to check one another.26
The Court then turned to the challenging question of how to preserve the
credibility of the states as a check on national power in the context of a system
that designates federal law supreme. Justice O’Connor explained:
The Federal Government holds a decided advantage in th[e] delicate
balance [between state and federal power]: the Supremacy Clause. As long
as it is acting within the powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress
may impose its will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas
traditionally regulated by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a
federalist system. It is a power that we must assume Congress does not
exercise lightly.27

I want to focus on the Court’s claim that it is somehow “extraordinary” for
Congress to “impose its will on the States” or to “legislate in areas
traditionally regulated by the States,” as this intuition appears to provide
crucial support for the clear statement rule the Court applied. It is one thing,
the Court seems to be saying, to rely on inference and implication in the
course of concluding that Congress has done something mundane, but it is
quite another to do so where extraordinary measures are at issue. In that
context, only a clear statement will do.
But just what does the Court mean when it tells us that such exercises of
congressional power are “extraordinary . . . in a federalist system?” And,
whatever the precise contours of this claim, what, exactly, is the basis for it?
What makes exercise of the power in question “extraordinary?”

23
24
25
26
27

Id. at 470.
Id. at 457 (quoting Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 725 (1868)).
Id. at 458 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, supra note 9, at 292 (James Madison)). This is in
contrast to the “few and defined” powers bestowed upon the national government. Id.
Id. at 458–59.
Id. at 460 (internal citation omitted) (citing U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2).

Feb. 2019]

NEGLECTING NATIONALISM

669

It is certainly not unusual, in the context of a federal scheme of
government, for national law to trump the law of member states. To the
contrary, the Court was closer to the mark, more recently, when it quoted
Alexander Hamilton’s observation that the Supremacy Clause (which lies at
the root of federal law’s capacity to displace state law) “only declares a truth,
which flows immediately and necessarily from the institution of a Federal
Government.”28 Thus, it seems doubtful that the Court meant to intimate
that this feature of our constitutional system is “extraordinary” in the sense
of being unlike the powers typically found in other federal systems.
It is tempting to say that the passage means to classify as “extraordinary”
only those exercises of federal power that encroach upon areas that have
traditionally been regulated by the states or, perhaps, exercises of federal
power that encroach on especially sensitive sovereign functions. But this does
not seem like the most natural reading of the relevant language. Read in its
entirety, and especially in light of (1) the breadth of the interpretive rules the
Court justifies by reference to this consideration,29 and (2) the immediately
preceding reference to the Supremacy Clause, the passage seems to signal
that federal supremacy as a whole—not just some particularly aggressive
manifestations of it—is somehow extraordinary (and extraordinarily
worrisome). The point, it seems to me, is simply that supremacy and the
displacement of state law are a big deal, and so courts ought to handle them
with care.
It is when we view Gregory in just this light, however, that the Court’s
denial of nationalism comes into focus. For the notion that we ought to think
of national supremacy as “extraordinary” in this way, and that we ought
therefore to presume that Congress does not deploy it lightly, makes sense
only if we come to the interpretive exercise with firm priors about the
constitutionally preferred distribution of authority between the federal
government and the states. One needs some baseline against which to assess
which exercises of congressional power are “extraordinary” (and ought
therefore to be deployed gingerly) and which ones can move forward without
much wringing of hands. For Gregory’s account to have purchase, then, one

28
29

Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO.
33, supra note 9, at 205 (Alexander Hamilton)).
See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460–61 (noting that application of the ADEA on the facts presented would
interfere with Missouri’s fundamental sovereign authority to “defin[e] their constitutional officers,”
but also classifying any legislation that “affect[s] the federal balance” as “sensitive” and, thus,
meriting application of a clear statement rule (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
58, 65 (1989)).
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must enter the process of constitutional interpretation resolved to understand
(at least some) nationalist features of constitutional text in light of a preconceived vision of the federal structure—one that places a thumb on the
scale in favor of preserving state power and autonomy.
This is all well and good, up to a point. It is perfectly ordinary for
conceptions of constitutional structure—including, of course, ideas relating
to state power and sovereignty—to drive the interpretation of ambiguous
constitutional text.30 Indeed, it seems inevitable that features of our
constitutional federalism to which the text speaks only obliquely will be
affirmed or denied by reference to (among other things) structural
considerations. But one cannot sensibly make this move, I think, with respect
to the contours of federal supremacy, for the Supremacy Clause is so
obviously central to the Constitution’s allocation of power between the
federal government and the states. To craft a theory of federalism without it
is to do Hamlet without the Prince; and to then rely on such a theory to set
limits on federal supremacy itself is to run the analysis in reverse.
This is not the only way in which the Gregory opinion is neglectful of
nationalism.
Here we confront our first example of courts’ and
commentators’ tendency to conflate “federalism” with the preservation of
state power. Gregory does so by describing the “numerous advantages”31
associated with the adoption of a federal system in the following terms:
This federal[ ] structure . . . . assures a decentralized government that will
be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a heterogeneous society; it increases
opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes; it allows for
more innovation and experimentation in government; and it makes
government more responsive by putting the States in competition for a
mobile citizenry.
. . . [It also provides] a check on abuses of government power. . . . Just as
the separation and independence of the coordinate branches of the Federal
Government serve to prevent the accumulation of excessive power in any
one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and the Federal
Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.32

As noted earlier,33 the problem with this account is not that it’s inaccurate;
the problem is that it’s incomplete. The “advantages” identified in this

30

31
32
33

See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 548–58 (2012) (Roberts, C.J.)
(construing the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause in light of the principle that
the federal government does not enjoy a general police power).
Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 1–5.
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passage are those that might follow from the decision to devolve power from
a central authority to member states;34 those associated with the
centralization of power—the reasons we have a truly federal system as
opposed to a loosely bound collective like the one that prevailed under the
Articles of Confederation—are simply ignored.
In this respect, Gregory’s account of the advantages associated with
federalism is rather ironic. A reader of the passage quoted above could be
forgiven for deducing that the establishment of our federal system marked a
transition from a unitary system of government to one characterized by
greater autonomy for sub-national entities. Of course the opposite is true.
The transition from the Articles of Confederation to the scheme of
government laid out in our Constitution was an exercise in consolidation and
nationalism, with the establishment of a new, more powerful, central
government as its centerpiece. Gregory obscures this point entirely.
I am quite sure that all of the Justices in the Gregory majority were aware of
the two-way nature of federal systems, including our own. And I am equally
confident that those Justices could identify the key benefits associated with
centralization and would acknowledge (though it might take a bit of cajoling)
that our Constitution endeavors to secure them. Moreover, it could be argued
that there was little reason for the Gregory Court to explore the benefits
associated with the nationalist side of our federal scheme, given that the anxiety
piqued by the statute under review sounded in federal meddling in the internal
affairs of state government. This is all by way of saying that before we make
hay of Gregory’s unbalanced account of what federalism is for, it is worth
pausing to consider context and to assess whether this is an instance of sloppy
exposition rather than constitutional confusion (or, worse, misdirection).
But I do not think we can let the Court off the hook that easily. For even
if it is true that application of the ADEA to state court judges raises concerns
that sound in state autonomy, the constitutional anxiety reverses field the
moment we determine to rig the interpretive exercise in the interest of
preserving regulatory space for the states. What are the hazards of deploying
a rule that might hinder congressional efforts to address social and economic
challenges that are national in scope? What are the potential advantages of
authorizing Congress to set aside states’ autonomy from time to time—even,
perhaps, in connection with the internal organization of state government?
The Gregory Court does not say, and, perhaps more important, it does not
even acknowledge that these are questions of constitutional moment. The
nationalist side of the federal balance is thus rendered invisible.
34

See supra note 5.
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2. “Why We Care About Federalism in the First Place”
The academic literature pertaining to these federalism-based interpretive
rules neglects nationalism in similar ways.35 For example, it is not at all
uncommon for observers who purport to be enumerating the benefits
associated with the adoption of a federal system to list only the benefits
associated with devolution. Many of the commentators who make this move
treat the above-quoted passage from Gregory as an authoritative account of
what our federal system is designed to do.36 Others construct their own
accounts, but land in much the same place—a half-picture of the functional
benefits of federalism masquerading as a comprehensive one.37
35

36

37

There are, of course, contributions to the literature that take heed of both sides of the federal
balance. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 9, at 386 (“Valuing federalism means making a serious
attempt to identify and measure the values on both sides of the federalist balance.”); Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1, 5 (2007) (acknowledging that “nationalism is also a constitutional value”); Kramer, supra
note 9, at 1502 (“There are, after all, two sides to federalism: not just preserving state authority
where appropriate, but also enabling the federal government to act where national action is
desirable.”); Young, supra note 21, at 1736. In some ways, however, even some of these examples
reflect and reinforce confusion about (and neglect for) nationalism.
In Hills’ case, the point is a semantic one. Take a look at the passage leading up to his
observation that nationalism qualifies as a constitutional value:
Consider, first, the idea of a federalism-promoting canon of construction that would
require a clear statutory statement before a judge could construe federal law to preempt
state law. Such a canon is typically justified by the general notion that federalism is an
important value in the American constitutional scheme. The difficulty with such a broad
invocation of federalism, however, is that it is too general. After all, nationalism is also a
constitutional value . . . .
Hills, supra, at 5 (footnote omitted). This passage has the virtue of properly affording nationalism
the status of a constitutional value, but it misses the point that nationalism is a part of federalism, not
distinct from it. Hills describes a state-autonomy-promoting rule as a “federalism-promoting
canon,” thus disregarding the fact that a state-autonomy promoting rule might actually undermine
federalism, properly understood. Id. Professor Friedman, meanwhile, properly acknowledges that
the promotion of state power and autonomy constitutes only “half of the story about valuing
federalism.” Friedman, supra note 9, at 405. But he then devotes nearly twenty pages of analysis
to that half of the balance, while covering the nationalist half in just five. This is not a conceptual
neglect for nationalism, as we see in some of the commentary I explore here, but it tends to reinforce
the notion that federalism is principally concerned with the preservation of state power.
See, e.g., David Freeman Engstrom, Drawing Lines Between Chevron and Pennhurst: A Functional
Analysis of the Spending Power, Federalism, and the Administrative State, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1224 (2004);
Calvin R. Massey, Etiquette Tips: Some Implications of “Process Federalism,” 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
175, 211 (1994); David S. Schwartz, State Judges as Guardians of Federalism: Resisting the Federal Arbitration
Act’s Encroachment on State Law, 16 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 129, 130–31 (2004); see also Michael S.
Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 93, 98 n.24 (2002) (describing the key passage
from Gregory as an “oft-cited laundry list of federalism’s advantages”).
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, Federalism and the Rehnquist Court: A Normative Defense, 574 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 24, 27 (2001) (discussing reasons why federalism—which Calabresi labels
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Some of the starkest examples of this phenomenon come from the work
of Professor Young, who has written a series of articles advocating a robust
presumption against federal preemption of state law.38 Young insists that,
under modern conditions, the presumption is essential to the preservation of
state autonomy, which, in turn, is essential to securing the benefits associated
with a federal system of government. Indeed, Young has gone so far as to
argue that “limiting the preemptive impact of federal law on state regulation”
ought to be “[t]he first priority of federalism doctrine.”39 He explains “state
governments . . . need to have meaningful things to do. Federalism cannot
provide regulatory diversity unless states have autonomy to set divergent
policies; state governments cannot provide fora for political participation and
competition unless meaningful decisions are being made in those fora.”40
The move from here to a set of claims about preemption doctrine is
straightforward. Young writes:
The whole point of preemption is generally to force national uniformity on
a particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity and experimentation. And
preemption removes issues within its scope from the policy agenda of state
and local governments, requiring that citizen participation and deliberation
with respect to those issues take place at the national level.41

38

39
40

41

“[c]onstitutionally mandated decentralization”—is a good thing, and running through a list similar
to the one in Gregory); Merritt, supra note 3, at 3–10 (noting that “contemporary thinkers identify at
least four positive features of our federal system,” and specifying (1) the capacity of the two levels of
government to check one another, (2) the proliferation of opportunities for political participation at
the state and local levels, (3) state governments’ capacities to satisfy the diverse preferences of the
American people, and (4) the possibility of innovation and experimentation and innovation at the
state level); John C. Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 1311, 1402–03
(1997) (describing federalism as a “normative good” that stands opposed to the reduction of states’
rights, and describing the advantages of federalism in terms similar to those laid out in Gregory).
See Ernest A. Young, “The Ordinary Diet of the Law”: The Presumption Against Preemption in the Roberts
Court, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 253 [hereinafter Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court]; Ernest A. Young,
Two Cheers for Process Federalism, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1349 (2001) [hereinafter Young, Two Cheers];
Young, supra note 19. But see Young, supra note 21 (focusing carefully on the two-sided nature of
federal systems).
Young, supra note 19, at 130.
Id. at 52 (emphasis omitted). Elsewhere, Young links this observation to the interest in fostering
among citizens a sense of loyalty to state government, which, he insists, “is the ultimate safeguard
of state autonomy.” Young, Two Cheers, supra note 38, at 1368. Young explains:
[I]n order to attract and retain the loyalty of the People, state governments have to
maintain the ability to provide beneficial regulation and services in areas that really matter.
They must, in other words, have plenty to do. If we reach the point that most regulatory
jurisdiction and government largesse flows to the national government, popular loyalty will
follow. And at that point, we cannot expect the political process to protect the States.
Id. at 1369.
Young, supra note 19, at 130–31.
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Thus, he concludes: “Doctrines limiting federal preemption of state law . . .
go straight to the heart of the reasons why we care about federalism in the
first place.”42
This last claim—that the presumption against preemption “goes to the
heart of the reasons why we care about federalism”—is telling. For it is no
more accurate to say that doctrines limiting preemption go to the heart of the
reasons we care about federalism than it is to say that doctrines facilitating
preemption do the same. We care about federalism because there are
benefits to empowering states and because there are benefits to
disempowering them.43 And we cared to establish a political federation “in
the first place” because, among other things, excessive independence and
autonomy for the states was understood by many in the Founding generation
to be an impediment to the flourishing of the nascent states operating under
the Articles of Confederation.44 Thus, one cannot glibly leap from the
observation that a particular practice is likely to bolster state autonomy to
the conclusion that that practice is a salutary one from the perspective of our
constitutional federalism.45
Young’s tendency to conflate federalism with state autonomy is evident
elsewhere in his writings on preemption. Thus, he describes the presumption
against preemption and related rules of statutory interpretation as
“profederalism clear statement rules,”46 and elsewhere he characterizes them
as “doctrines to protect federalism.”47 But these characterizations are
supported only by claims that the rules in question are conducive to the
promotion of state autonomy, and that alone tells us nothing about whether
they are, in fact, “profederalism.” Again, at least some of the time, the
diminution of state power and autonomy associated with the preemption of
state law is entirely healthy from a federalism perspective. Indeed,
commitment to this idea is implicit in the decision to enter into a political
union in the first place—or, at least, it is implicit in the decision to form a
42

43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 131; see also Young, supra note 21, at 1762 (“[F]ederalism doctrine should be designed to
maximize the values that undergird our commitment to federalism in the first place, such as the
values of state-by-state diversity and experimentation, political participation, and the ability of the
states to protect individual liberty.”).
See, e.g., Hills, supra note 35, at 5 (“The whole point of the federal scheme is to suppress states’
creativity.”).
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 15, 22 supra note 9 (Alexander Hamilton).
Some of Young’s work is much more careful along this dimension. See Young, supra note 21, at
1806; Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court, supra note 38, at 319–24.
Young, supra note 19, at 116.
Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court, supra note 38, at 321; see also id. at 256 (asserting that “the
courts’ role in protecting federalism should focus on facilitating and enhancing the operation of . . .
political and procedural checks on national authority”).
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union in which the central government enjoys meaningful powers of its own
and in which national law is designated supreme over the law of member
states. To conflate federalism with state autonomy is to miss this
fundamental point about how our federal system works and to obscure the
fact that an unduly narrow construction of national law (or of the federal
government’s authority under the Constitution) might upset the
constitutional balance every bit as much as an overly broad one.
Professor Young is not the only commentator to neglect nationalism in
this way. To the contrary, variations on this theme abound in the literature
on preemption. For example, in the course of advocating diminished judicial
reliance on the doctrine of obstacle preemption, Professor Nelson has argued
that “our federal system is premised on the notion that members of Congress
will not pursue federal policies to the total exclusion of state policies.”48
Perhaps that is true. But it would be equally accurate to say that our federal
system is premised on the notion—indeed, it is rooted in the hope—that
members of Congress will sometimes deploy their powers just so they might
exclude states (sometimes totally) from one policymaking sphere or another.49
Some of what is happening here is easy enough to understand. Many of
the commentators who characterize federalism in these terms surely mean to
intimate that under present conditions—i.e. given the vastness of national power
under prevailing constitutional law and the broad sweep of federal regulatory
action in the modern world—our constitutional federalism calls for increased
attention to its state-autonomy-preserving side.50 These nationalismneglecting accounts of what our federalism is designed to do, they would
argue, are correctives necessitated by longstanding neglect of the devolutionary
side of the federal scheme. From this perspective, what we are seeing here is
not denial of the nationalist features of our constitutional system; it is, instead,
a reflection of the fact that we have little cause to worry about the health and
48
49

50

Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 280 (2000).
Nelson’s point might have greater purchase if we placed particularly heavy emphasis on his use of
the word “total.” It is true enough that Congress only rarely intends to preempt an entire field. But
Nelson offers this observation in the context of advocating the scaling back of “frustrates the purpose”
preemption, so we can resuscitate his argument on this score only by changing it considerably.
Consider also, in this vein, Paul Wolfson’s claim (advanced in a frequently cited article
defending the presumption against preemption) that “‘[u]niformity,’ ‘efficiency,’ ‘predictability,’
and ‘simplicity’ are euphemisms for complete disablement of state authority.” Paul Wolfson,
Preemption and Federalism: The Missing Link, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 69, 107 (1988). The basis for
this claim eludes me. We might just as readily say that the interests in uniformity, efficiency, and
so on are among the primary impulses motivating the establishment of our federal system. See, e.g.,
SHAPIRO, supra note 3, at 35–50.
In some of his work, Young makes this point explicitly and makes a sustained effort to defend it.
See generally Young, supra note 21.
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stability of our commitment to nationalism/centralization.
But even if the instinct to write about federalism in these terms is a
reaction to the steady push in the direction of centralization that we have
experienced over the years, the consequence is a significant skewing of our
constitutional discourse. Far too much of the commentary in this space
simply fails to provide this context in the course of making the sort of stark
claims about our federal system that I flagged above. Instead, as we have
seen, seemingly authoritative sources, both on the courts and in the academy,
now routinely treat federalism as it were synonymous with devolution or
states’ rights. Taken together, these phenomena suggest that even as
nationalism has flourished as a matter of constitutional fact and (in some
important respects) constitutional doctrine, it has been marginalized as a
matter of constitutional theory.
3. The Presumption Against Preemption and Neglect for Nationalism: Some Further
Observations
The neglect for nationalism that characterizes the law and scholarly
discourse relating to the presumption against preemption has other
manifestations. For example, courts routinely insist that the presumption
applies with special force when Congress regulates in an area that has
traditionally been dominated by the States.51 The underlying logic is clear
51

See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 334 (2008) (“The presumption against preemption
is heightened ‘where federal law is said to bar state action in fields of traditional state regulation.’”
(quoting N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 655 (1995))); Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) (“In all pre-emption cases, and
particularly in those in which Congress has ‘legislated . . . in a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ we
‘start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded
. . . unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.’” (emphasis added) (internal citation
omitted) (quoting Rice v. Sante Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))). Commentators
often make the same move. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW.
U. L. REV. 727, 741 (2008) (“It might make sense to apply a presumption against preemption in
areas traditionally assigned to the states . . . .”). Indeed, the Court gestured at this notion in Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corporation, which is generally treated as the birthplace of the modern presumption.
331 U.S. at 230 (beginning its analysis by noting that the statute under review entered “a field which
the States have traditionally occupied”). It should be noted that there is some confusion in the case
law on this score. Some passages (like the ones flagged above) suggest that there is a generally
applicable presumption against preemption, and an especially potent presumption when Congress
enters a field that has long been dominated by the states. Other times, it seems as if the presumption
applies only when Congress enters a realm of traditional state control. See, e.g., Buckman Co. v.
Plaintiff’s Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 347 (2001) (“Policing fraud against federal agencies is hardly
‘a field which the States have traditionally occupied,’ such as to warrant a presumption against
finding federal pre-emption of a state-law cause of action” (internal citation omitted) (quoting Rice,
331 U.S. at 230)).
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enough. If we are generally squeamish about federal incursions on state
autonomy (and the existence of a general presumption against preemption
suggests that we are), then it is reasonable to be especially squeamish—and to
deploy a more robust presumption—when such incursions threaten to disrupt
a long-entrenched practice of leaving some regulatory field to the states.
This line of reasoning is sensible, to be sure, but we might just as easily run
the analysis in the opposite direction. We might presume, in other words, that
when Congress takes the extraordinary step of entering a field that had
previously been left to the states, there must be an especially urgent need for
federal intervention. Under these conditions, the combined force of inertia,
tradition, and settled expectation is, presumably, at its apex, and so the barriers
to federal action are correlatively high. When those barriers are overcome—
when Congress musters the will to disturb long-established regulatory
patterns—it seems downright perverse to presume that minimal disruption was
intended and silly to think that such disruption might have been engineered
unthinkingly. Indeed, we might want to take special care, under such
circumstances, to avoid impeding Congress’s efforts to address what is likely
an especially tenacious social problem—one that the states had proven unable
or unwilling to solve despite longstanding regulatory freedom to do so.
I do not mean to suggest by this that there ought to be a presumption in
favor of preemption when Congress enters a field that had previously been
dominated by the states. I mean only to highlight the fact that, in grappling
with this particular issue, the nationalist perspective I am offering here is
largely absent from the discourse.52
The same could be said in connection with a well-known move in the
academic literature relating to the presumption against preemption—a move
that is most closely associated with the work of Professor Brad Clark. Clark
has taken pains to call attention to the relationship between the Constitution’s
separation of powers—in particular, the cumbersome process laid out in
Article I for the enactment of federal law—and the preservation of state
autonomy. The separation of powers, he explains, “preserve[s] federalism
both by making federal law more difficult to adopt, and by assigning
lawmaking power solely to actors subject to the political safeguards of
52

Even Professor Dinh, who has shown a willingness to swim against the tide by insisting that “the
constitutional structure of federalism does not admit to a general presumption against federal
preemption of state law,” Viet D. Dinh, Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2087
(2000), has argued that “when Congress legislates in areas traditionally governed by the states . . .
it stands to reason that Congress would proceed more cautiously and provide an interstitial rather
than a comprehensive or primary set of regulations.” Id. at 2101.
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federalism.”53 The presumption against preemption, he argues, doubles down
on this effort. It reins in federal judges who might be too quick to deem federal
law preemptive, and it helps to ensure that preemption (and the concomitant
contraction of state autonomy) is activated only by way of the burdensome
procedures laid out in Article I and by officials who are (by virtue of the
political safeguards54) apt to care about the preservation of state power.55
Here too, the conclusion seems sensible. It is reasonable to worry (or at
least wonder) about the consequences for state autonomy of national
lawmaking outside of the arduous process laid out in Article I. But here too,
we might just as readily run the analysis the other way. We might insist that
the political and procedural barriers to federal lawmaking are so high that we
ought to guard zealously against judicial constructions that fail to give federal
law its due. Indeed, it seems backwards to lay emphasis, as Clark does, on
the extreme difficulty of enacting federal law, only to then insist that
whatever does make its way through the political and procedural gauntlet
ought to be treated like some regulatory virus in need of containment. We
might presume, instead, that such measures as survive bicameralism and
presentment (to say nothing of the myriad vetogates that are not enshrined
in the Constitution56) are likely to reflect broad and deep consensus about the
need for federal action to address some pressing national problem.
More generally, while Clark is right that an array of legislation-inhibiting
dynamics is woven into the fabric of our Constitution, so too, of course, are
the affirmative grants of power to the national government. And I do not
think the Constitution confers these powers on the national government just
so we might wring hands and cower whenever they are exercised.
My point is not that federal law ought always to be read expansively, just
because it is rather difficult to enact. It is simply that Professor Clark’s
53

54
55
56

Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321, 1324 (2001).
This passage offers yet another example (surely there are hundreds, at least) of a commentator
deploying the term “federalism” where “state autonomy” would be more apt. There can be no
doubt that the cumbersome federal law-making process helps to preserve state autonomy. It is
possible, too, that that process helps to preserve “federalism,” properly understood. But whether
that is so depends on the optimal allocation of power between the federal government and the
states. I think it is safe to say that Professor Clark is of the view that, at least under modern
conditions, structural norms that tend to enhance the autonomy of the states are structural norms
that help to preserve our federalism. But, like so many other observers, he skips the step of stating
as much and explaining why that is so, and instead he treats the two things as if they were the same.
For discussion of the political safeguards theory, see infra Part II.
Clark, supra note 53, at 1428.
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1441, 1444–
48 (2008).
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observations about the cumbersome, politically fraught nature of the federal
legislative process lend themselves to two different conclusions about how to
deal with uncertainty relating to the preemptive reach of federal law.
Professor Clark’s conclusion has gained considerable currency in the
academic commentary relating to preemption,57 while the nationalist
alternative has largely been ignored.58
Finally, it should be noted that the core premise underlying the
presumption against preemption would, if taken to its logical conclusion,
support radical changes to established practice relating to the interpretation
of federal law. The premise is that our Constitution favors outcomes that
preserve regulatory space for the states59—that courts ought to “err on the
side of state autonomy”60 by refusing to “give the state-displacing weight of
federal law to mere congressional ambiguity.”61 But if that is right, then it
would stand to reason that any time courts are called upon to interpret federal
law—whether or not preemption is in view—they ought to resolve
ambiguities in favor of the construction that gives federal law more limited
reach. Otherwise, federal law might be deemed to apply in cases Congress
did not intend to control, thereby narrowing states’ freedom to enact and
enforce a contrary rule.
In assessing, for example, whether Title VII prohibits employment practices
that have a disparate impact on members of protected categories, federalism

57

58

59

60
61

See, e.g., John F. Manning, Lessons from a Nondelegation Canon, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1541, 1547–
48 (2008) (“Professor Clark’s Supremacy Clause thesis gives the presumption against preemption a
firm (though not unassailable) constitutional grounding.”); David S. Rubenstein, Delegating
Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1140, 1154–58 (2012); Young, Preemption in the Roberts Court,
supra note 38, at 279–80.
An important exception is Carlos Manuel Vázquez, The Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Nationalism, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1601, 1611 (2008) (“If the Constitution reflects a careful
balance of federalism and nationalism, then, just as it would be illegitimate for courts to recognize
a category of federal law created through procedures less onerous than those contemplated by the
Constitution, it would also be illegitimate for the courts to impose obstacles to federal lawmaking
not contemplated in the Constitution.”); see also id. at 1627–29 (noting that considerations of
constitutional structure cannot, by themselves, resolve the question of whether a presumption
against preemption is appropriate). Note that the first of these passages supplies yet another
example of the scholarly tendency to treat federalism and nationalism as opposing forces. See supra
notes 35–37.
See, e.g., Young, Two Cheers, supra note 38, at 1387–88 (describing the presumption against
preemption as a species of “constitutional review,” a way of “pushing interpretation of ambiguous
statutes away from areas of special constitutional sensitivity”).
Young, supra note 19, at 23 n.90.
Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 464 (1991) (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting TRIBE, supra note 16, § 6-25).
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would supply a reason to answer: “no.” And in every case calling for the
interpretation of federal criminal law, the interest in state autonomy—not just
the rule of lenity—would call for narrow construction of ambiguous provisions,
thereby leaving the states with more latitude to determine what sorts of conduct
will be criminalized within their borders. But conventions such as these are not
part of our interpretive tradition, and with good reason. For “nationalism,” as
Professor Hills has explained, “is also a constitutional value,”62 and interpretive
practices that serve generally to cabin the reach of federal law inhibit our
capacity to advance it. Much of the case law and literature relating to the
presumption against preemption is in denial on this score.
B. Translation, Compensating Adjustment, and Neglect for Nationalism
In this Section, I turn my attention to academic commentary that calls
on judges to “translate” our federalism or to make “compensating
adjustments” to the federal balance in light of the erosion of state autonomy
that has taken place over the course of United States history. Like the case
law and commentary we encountered in Section I.A, this literature is in
denial with respect to the nationalist side of our federal scheme. But unlike
the denial on display earlier, the species we confront here relates to textual
considerations, not functional ones. Specifically, we will examine sources
that endeavor to provide general accounts of what our constitutional
federalism demands, but disregard or seriously marginalize crucial
nationalist features of constitutional text in the course of doing so.
Ordinarily, I would be reluctant to treat the fact that a couple of law
review articles are insufficiently attentive to fragments of constitutional text
as important evidence that our constitutional culture is in a general state of
denial as to the import of those texts or the values underlying them. (I would
be more apt to classify such a thing as the sort of run-of-the-mill
argumentative shading I alluded to earlier.) In this case, however, I think the
omissions are telling. One would think it impossible for informed
observers—and certainly for respected authorities—to undertake to describe
the essential features of our federal system without engaging seriously with
the Reconstruction Amendments, as well as the Sixteenth and Seventeenth
Amendments. Yet the sources canvassed here do exactly that. These
omissions are too stark to allow us to chalk them up to an ordinary difference
of view as to the weight to be afforded this federal-power-granting clause or
that state-autonomy-preserving one. The more sensible diagnosis, I think—
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Hills, supra note 35, at 5.
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especially when we consider this commentary alongside the other sources
surveyed in this Article—is that something fundamental to our constitutional
discourse is askew. It is not yet our instinct to see our federalism whole.63
1. “Translating” or “Adjusting” Our Federalism
The leading commentators on constitutional translation, compensating
adjustment, and federalism are Professors Lawrence Lessig and Ernest
Young, and it is on their work that I focus here. In his article Translating
Federalism, Professor Lessig makes the case that fidelity to the Constitution
sometimes requires judges to conjure novel doctrinal constraints in an effort
to preserve features of the Framers’ plan that have come under pressure as a
result of changed real-world circumstances.64 These efforts at doctrinal
development, he says, can be thought of as exercises in translation. The
judge’s task is to “translate” a Founding era constitutional concept into a
modern setting,65 and the trick is to do so without crafting rules or rendering
decisions that seem overly political.66
The particulars of Lessig’s argument as applied to federalism are fairly
straightforward: The scope of the federal commerce power is contingent on
facts in the world; it is contingent, in particular, on the extent of national
economic integration. As our economy has become more integrated,
Congress’s regulatory reach has expanded,67 and that expansion (here’s the
rub) has disturbed the constitutionally ordained balance of power between
the federal government and the states.68
According to Lessig, the constitutionally required balance can be (roughly)
identified by considering the Constitution’s grants of power to the national
government in their historical context, the key piece of which is the relatively
low level of economic integration that prevailed during the late eighteenth
63
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Cf. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Reflections on the Hart and Wechsler Paradigm, 47 VAND. L. REV. 953, 980–
83 (1994) (noting that Federal Courts scholars have much work to do when it comes to synthesizing
the different conceptions of judicial federalism embodied in Founding era and Reconstruction era
sources of law).
See Lawrence Lessig, Translating Federalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 125, 131–
35.
Id. at 127 (emphasis omitted); see also Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165
(1993).
Lessig, supra note 64, at 170–76.
Id. at 137–40.
Id. at 143. Lessig makes a parallel point about the relationship between economic integration and
the reach of state power and explores its consequences for dormant commerce doctrine and the law
of preemption. Id. at 154–68.
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century. Under conditions of modest economic integration, the powers
bestowed on the national government by the Constitution left much to the
states’ discretion.69 It follows, Lessig argues, that the federal structure called
into being by the Constitution contemplates a robust sphere of state autonomy.
If we are to show fidelity to the Constitution, then—if we are to prevent the
constitutional value of state autonomy from being “rendered helpless by
changed circumstances”70—it is necessary to translate our federalism. It is
necessary, Lessig explains, “for the Court to craft . . . limits on regulative
authority, both state and federal, so as to check the growth in the commerce
power, to the extent that growth has set the original balance askew.”71
In a lengthy article titled Making Federalism Doctrine, Professor Young
pursues a similar line of reasoning, but with somewhat different points of
emphasis and a broader conception of the array of changes giving rise to the
need for doctrinal adaptation. Thus, in addition to focusing intently on the
relationship between economic integration and the expansion of the federal
commerce power,72 Young observes that the Constitution’s political and
procedural safeguards of federalism have eroded over time.73 These
developments, Young explains, tend to facilitate the production of federal
law, and that, in turn, causes the sphere of state autonomy to contract.
Young regards this as seriously worrisome from the perspective of
maintaining a healthy federal balance. As noted earlier,74 Young believes
that (1) states cannot hope to deliver the benefits associated with the adoption
of a federal system if they do not enjoy the loyalty of the people, and (2) states
cannot earn that loyalty if they lack meaningful autonomy. Young thus
concludes that our federal system is out of balance75 and that the duty of
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74
75

Id. at 140.
Id. at 146.
Id. at 192.
See Young, supra note 21, at 1764 (“The primary strategy of the original Constitution for preserving
the federal balance—the doctrine of enumerated powers—has become far less effective over the
last century with the advent of an integrated national economy.”). For a compelling challenge to
the conventional wisdom relating to the role of enumerated powers in our constitutional
architecture, see generally Richard Primus, The Limits of Enumeration, 124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014).
As far as political safeguards are concerned, Young emphasizes that (due to the Seventeenth
Amendment) state legislatures no longer enjoy representation in the Senate, and so we can expect
states’ institutional interests to figure less prominently in congressional deliberation. Young, supra
note 21, at 1764. As for procedural safeguards, Young notes that significant swaths of federal law
are now generated through administrative processes not subject to the checks associated with
lawmaking by Congress. Id. at 1792.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
Young, supra note 21, at 1806–07 (“[T]he power of the national government has grown to the point
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constitutional fidelity requires judges to engineer “compensating
adjustments.”76 It requires them to craft doctrinal rules that will restore some
measure of state autonomy and thereby push the system in the direction of
the constitutionally required equilibrium.77
2. Neglect
Many of the difficulties that inhere in the project of constitutional
translation/adjustment have been canvassed by others. Most notable are the
challenges of (1) figuring out which features of the constitutional landscape
should be regarded as adjustable in light of changed circumstances and
which should be treated as fixed points,78 and (2) determining when realworld changes merit compensating adjustment and when, instead,
constitutional interpreters ought to eschew efforts at compensation and just
go with the flow.79 My goal, however, is to explore a distinct concern relating
to the accounts offered by Professors Lessig and Young—one that has
received little attention in the relevant academic commentary.
Let us assume for the sake of argument that the Framers of our
Constitution, if confronted with the world as it is today, would remain
committed to the federalist enterprise. And let us presume, also, that some
set of observers (judges, one hopes) possess the tools necessary to discern
when the balance of power between the federal government and the states
has deviated so far from the constitutional plan as to call for translation or
adjustment. It would remain essential, even then, that efforts to nudge the
system in the direction of equilibrium be calibrated by reference to the
Constitution that we have today and not the one crafted in 1787. For the duty
of constitutional fidelity extends to the Reconstruction Amendments, as well
as the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments (and more), with at least as
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of tilting the constitutional balance at the expense of the states . . . .”).
Id. at 1775.
Id. at 1773–75, 1783–88, 1792–98.
See Michael J. Klarman, Antifidelity, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 381, 395 (1997) (“Translators have selected
an arbitrarily low level of generality at which to translate. They adjust the Framers’ constitutional
commitments to reflect changed circumstances, but fail to ask whether the Framers would have
remained committed to the same concepts had they been aware of future circumstances.”); see also
Merrill, supra note 51, at 750 (taking note of “the difficulty of identifying the [proper] baseline
against which one is to make a judgment about whether the division of power [between the federal
government and the states] requires rebalancing”).
See Klarman, supra note 78, at 400 (“[I]f national power expanded to meet changing reality, perhaps
this is a good argument for not making any compensating adjustment. . . . [Such adjustments]
would be, to some extent, removing with one hand what had just been granted with the other.”).
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much force as it extends to the original Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Professor Lessig seems to miss this point entirely. His seminal article on
federalism and translation does not address the possibility that the
transformative constitutional amendments of the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries might alter the translational calculus. Instead, Lessig
emphasizes the need “to reestablish something [the] ratifiers of the
Constitution chose,”80 “to assure that the constitutional structure original[ly]
established is . . . preserved,”81 and “to restore an original balance.”82 And
although he doesn’t come out and say so directly, it seems clear that Lessig
has in mind the ratifiers of the original Constitution and the structural
balance embodied in the 1787 version of the document.83
Professor Young does better along this dimension. Indeed, he states
explicitly that “courts owe fidelity to a constitutional tradition that includes
the whole sweep of our history, not just the Founding moment;”84 and he
explains that “the binding force of history extends . . . not just [to] 1787, but
[to] 1800, 1868, 1876, 1937, 1964, 1980, 1994, etc.”85 But when the time
comes for Young to integrate these post-Founding developments into his
account of our federalism, the analysis goes awry.
Young takes the position that the constitutional amendments of the latenineteenth and early-twentieth centuries did not meaningfully reorient the
federal system, and so the duty of fidelity attaches, still, to a conception of
state-federal balance that is firmly grounded in the late-eighteenth century.86
In particular, Young treats the Reconstruction Amendments and the
80
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Lessig, supra note 64, at 135.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 134.
See, e.g., id. at 128 (“a founding balance”); id. at 129 (“the framing balance”); id. at 130 (“restoring a
balance envisioned in the framing generation”); id. at 135 (“a balance from the founding regime”);
id. at 136 (“recreate the initial balance of federalism”). Professor Lessig’s failure to engage with
amendments enacted during Reconstruction and beyond cannot be explained away on the ground
that those amendments did not directly address the particular issue on which he focused attention—
i.e. the scope of federal power under the Commerce Clause and the outer limits of federal regulatory
power as a general matter. As Lessig acknowledges (indeed, as he takes pains to emphasize),
answers to those questions are properly devised by reference to big picture assumptions and
understandings about the structure of our federalism, and those assumptions and understandings
are informed by (among other things) all of what the Constitution has to tell us about federal power
and the limits on state autonomy.
Young, supra note 21, at 1756; see also id. at 1773 (advocating an approach to constitutionalism “that
takes account of the entire arc of our history”); id. at 1796–97 (similar).
Id. at 1774.
Id. at 1812 (“[N]othing in our history since the Founding absolves courts of their obligation of
fidelity to the basic notion of a federal balance.”).
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Seventeenth Amendment (the Sixteenth is not discussed at all) as targeted,
narrow points of departure from the federalism of the Founding era—
departures that did not disrupt the basic contours of the system or dislodge
the original Constitution’s “strong commitment to a balanced federal
structure.”87 He insists that the Reconstruction Amendments did nothing
more than “confer national power to deal with the issues of racial oppression
that led to the War,”88 and thus left “the basic allocation of authority between
[the] states and nation intact.”89 While he acknowledges that the
Seventeenth Amendment’s abandonment of the practice of having state
legislatures choose United States senators in favor of a scheme of direct
popular election could not help but diminish congressional solicitude for
states’ institutional interests, he deems this a “collateral” effect of the
Amendment, and argues that that effect ought to be cabined in the name of
Burkean incrementalism.90
Young’s assessment of the consequences for federalism doctrine of the
Reconstruction Amendments, as well as the Seventeenth Amendment, is
methodologically dubious. He acknowledges that when it comes to structural
principles such as federalism, the constitutional whole is generally treated as
greater than the sum of its individual textual parts.91 Standard practice, in
other words, is to consider relevant fragments of text together, and to
construct a general account of our constitutional federalism from there. The
divide-and-conquer strategy Young deploys when he attempts to integrate (or,
more accurately, determines not to integrate) the post-Civil War amendments
into his account of federalism is at odds with this conventional practice.
More importantly, his reasoning is unpersuasive. Our Constitution now
binds states to national norms of equality and procedural fairness, and it
empowers Congress to enact laws enforcing those norms.92 It establishes an
array of national rules governing access to the franchise.93 It confers upon
the federal government vastly greater financial resources and leverage by
authorizing direct taxation of income.94 And it severs the direct electoral link
87
88
89
90
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Id. at 1766; see also id. at 1775 (discussing “a judicial obligation to enforce the Founders’ commitment
to some sort of balance between national and state authority”).
Id. at 1813.
Id.
Id. at 1813–14.
Id. at 1747 (refusing to endorse the notion that the “authority of structural principles” is limited to
“their specific instantiations in the text”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
U.S. CONST. amends. XV, XIX, XXIV, XXVI.
U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. For a discussion on the role of the Sixteenth Amendment in
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between the United States Senate and the state legislatures in favor of one
between the Senate and the people.95 None of this was true in 1787. This is
not to say, necessarily, that state autonomy no longer qualifies as an
important constitutional value; but if it does, it is a very different value from
the one that prevailed at the Founding.
It bears emphasis, moreover, that these changes to our federal system are
not an outgrowth of judge-made legal doctrine, nor are they byproducts of
the sweeping social and economic changes on which the translation theorists
focus so much attention. These changes are written into the text of our
Constitution, and they reflect intentional decisions by the People to empower
the nation and/or the national government at the expense of the states. Even
considered in isolation, not one of these changes could sensibly be classified
as only a minor deviation from the federalism of the Founding era. And when
we consider them in the aggregate, it becomes apparent that our federal
system has undergone sweeping revision. Professors Lessig and Young, it
would seem, are calling for fidelity to a Constitution that we no longer have.
The analyses offered by these translation theorists are examples of, and
are enabled by, the neglect for nationalism that pervades our constitutional
discourse. It is too facile to say that a world in which supremacy is classified
as “extraordinary,” and in which “federalism” and “devolution” are
routinely conflated, is predictably one in which the federalism-restructuring
amendments of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries will be
overlooked or radically minimized. But the phenomena are mutually
reinforcing, and they conspire to produce a badly skewed picture of our
federal scheme.
II. COMPLACENCY
In this Part, I turn my attention to a different breed of neglect for
nationalism—one I label “complacency.” The complacency I document
here comes in two (related) forms. First, there is the tendency to treat the
preservation of state power as the central challenge for the modern law and
theory of federalism. It is the tendency to presume that, with the changes to
our constitutional law and culture that took place over the course of the

95

underwriting the expansion of federal power, see Douglas Laycock, Notes on the Role of Judicial Review,
the Expansion of Federal Power, and the Structure of Constitutional Rights, 99 YALE L.J. 1711, 1736–37 (1990)
(reviewing ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989) and noting that “[t]he Sixteenth Amendment made
available to the Federal Government a vast resource of revenue previously denied to it”).
U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
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twentieth century, we have achieved something like peak-nationalism, and
all that remains for the constitutional law of federalism to do is tend to the
vulnerable states. Second, there is the instinct to explore and to celebrate
new and underappreciated vehicles for the empowerment of states, without
assessing the costs of such empowerment for national power, national policy,
and national institutions. These instincts betray a lack of concern for the
stability of our nationalism and a lack of imagination as to the possibility of
its further development.
A. The Political Safeguards Theory: Setting the Terms of Debate
When Herbert Wechsler published his famous essay The Political Safeguards
of Federalism96 in 1954, it was in the midst of considerable intellectual ferment
pertaining to the expansion of federal power that had taken place over the
prior two decades.97 Just four years earlier, Edward Corwin had taken to the
pages of the Virginia Law Review to mark “[t]he [p]assing of [d]ual
[f]ederalism” and to argue that our federal system “has been overwhelmed
and submerged . . . so that today the question faces us whether the
constituent States of the System can be saved for any useful purpose.”98
Corwin was not alone in this assessment.99
Wechsler, however, did not share these concerns. Indeed, the central
message of his brief essay might best be summed up as: “Relax. The states
are—and will continue to be—just fine.” Wechsler’s confidence that the
devolutionary side of our federalism could and would continue to thrive, even
as the national government extended its regulatory reach (and the Supreme
Court got out of its way), was rooted in a series of observations about the
constitutionally ordained mechanics of our political system. These
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Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Rôle of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L.
REV. 215, 216 (2000) (“The full implications of the battle waged in the 1930s over the role of the
national government had not been immediately apparent. . . . It was only after the war, in the late
1940s, that commentators were able to begin soberly to examine the transformation that had taken
place. While most of the commentary [at the conference during which Wechsler presented Political
Safeguards] applauded the Supreme Court’s renunciation of its role as Protector of the States and
Keeper of the Spirit of ‘98, justifications seemed surprisingly hard to find. A few commentators
mentioned Congress’s superior ability to deal with the complexities of modern society, but others
embraced the new regime more hesitantly, plainly uneasy with the Supreme Court’s withdrawal
from the field of battle.” (footnotes omitted)).
Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism, 36 VA. L. REV. 1, 23 (1950).
See, e.g., Frank R. Strong, The Future of Federalism in the United States, 22 TEX. L. REV. 255, 255 (1944).
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observations are among the most widely known and carefully scrutinized
claims to be advanced by a scholar of federalism over the last century, so I
will not rehearse them in detail here. Suffice it to say that, in Wechsler’s
view, states’ role in the composition of the federal government—in
particular, their role in the selection of the President, senators, and members
of the House—makes it exceedingly unlikely that the national government
will seriously impair states’ autonomy.100 Our politics, he argued, is rigged
to assure that federal officials will take account of state interests when
exercising their authority, and so the system is “intrinsically well adapted to
retarding or restraining new intrusions by the center on the domain of the
states.”101 Wechsler pivoted from this point to the more provocative claim
that the task of protecting states from federal intervention is primarily one
for Congress, not the federal courts.102
Wechsler’s argument would come in for heavy criticism over the years,
some of it justified. Most notably, even if we credit the claim that structural
features of our political system will cause national politicians to be sensitive
to state interests, it does not follow that the system is well adapted to assure the
preservation of state autonomy.103 And it is the latter, not the former, that
typically occupies the attention of those concerned about the diminished
standing of states within our federal system.
My goal, however, is not to assess the merits of Wechsler’s arguments. It
is to call attention to the questions at the foreground of his analysis and to
flag some important questions he chose not to engage. The political
safeguards theory is an answer to the question of whether one could
reasonably expect our constitutional system to attend to the interests and
autonomy of the states even under conditions of expansive federal authority.
It is, more specifically, an effort to highlight (what were at that point)
underappreciated reasons to answer that question in the affirmative.
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See Wechsler, supra note 96, at 546–48. These are not the only features of our constitutional order
that, in Wechsler’s view, are conducive to the promotion of state interests. See id. at 544–46
(discussing the simple fact of “the continuous existence of the states” and the persistence of a legalpolitical tradition that treats federal regulation as exceptional and in need of special justification).
Id. at 558.
Id. at 559 (“Federal intervention as against the states is thus primarily a matter for congressional
determination in our system as it stands.”).
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 9, at 1510–11; Saikrishna B. Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Puzzling
Persistence of Process-Based Federalism Theories, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1459, 1477 (2001) (“[T]he disciples of
the political safeguards theory . . . mistake the advancement of state interests for the protection of
state sovereignty.”).
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At some level, this hardly seems worthy of note. It is predictable that
students of federalism during the post-New Deal era, confronted with the
Supreme Court’s capitulation to the significant expansion of federal
regulatory power, would worry that state autonomy had gone the way of the
dodo. Still, it matters that Wechsler (and his scholarly descendants104) focus
so intently on state autonomy, for the decision to do so is, from a nationalist
perspective, a decision to play defense.105 Here’s what I mean: As noted
earlier, the dramatic changes to our federal system that took hold during the
first half of the twentieth century were motivated (in part) by real world
changes in the integration of our nation’s economy and in the complexity of
the regulatory challenges confronting the country.106 As these challenges
came into focus, we might have expected observers to worry that our
commitment to preserving state power and autonomy would impede efforts
to address them. We might have expected them to worry, moreover, along
two distinct dimensions. First, there is the matter of federal authority—the
question of whether the prevailing conception of the national-power-granting
clauses of the Constitution was sufficiently capacious to underwrite necessary
regulatory interventions by the federal government. That question was
heavily mooted during the first half of the twentieth century and resolved on
decidedly nationalist terms, largely through the landmark decisions in NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,107 United States v. Darby,108 and Wickard v. Filburn.109
But there is also the question of whether invigorated and active national
governance might require reimagining the constitutional duties that run from
the states to the nation. Thus, as our collective sense of what counts as a
legitimate federal regulatory interest expanded, and as the doctrinal tools
necessary for the federal government to advance those interests were
activated, we might have expected scholars to attend, also, to the question of
how federal laws, policies, and interests might be insulated from the
disruptive behavior of dissenting states. After all, it is not much use
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See, e.g., JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS: A
FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 171–90 (1980);
Kramer, supra note 97, at 215–16.
Wechsler’s essay, it must be emphasized, is not an expression of anxiety about the expansion of
national power; it is an effort to alleviate such anxiety. So, while it is right to say that the safeguards
theory is fixated on state autonomy, this fixation registers differently from the handwringing about
state autonomy one tends to see from skeptics of national power.
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
312 U.S. 100 (1941).
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
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ratcheting up federal regulatory capacity if that capacity is readily subject to
sabotage. Scholars might also have turned to the question of whether and
how states could be called upon to help implement and enforce federal law
and policy, since recognition of ever-more-expansive federal regulatory
power might also call for the deployment of new or infrequently used tools—
of which the states might be one—to buttress and effectuate that power.110
Wechsler’s essay, however, does not engage these concerns and focuses,
instead, on the question of whether our federal system could be expected to
remain sensitive to state interests. There is some temptation to insist that
there was not really much cause to worry (at least at the level of legal doctrine)
about states’ obligations vis-à-vis federal law and about the prospect of giving
back the nationalist gains associated with New Deal constitutionalism. After
all, the Supremacy Clause is the constitutional device we use to mediate
conflict between state and federal law, and it comes down emphatically on
the side of the nation. With the principle of federal supremacy in place, one
might argue, it was not necessary to tweak the constitutional or
subconstitutional law of state duties in order to position the states properly
alongside the newly empowered national government.
From this
perspective, scholarly neglect of this set of questions seems like a non-event.
But this reasoning is shortsighted. For it is by no means obvious that, in
order to deal effectively with the social and economic challenges presented
by modernity, federal supremacy and other nationalist values need only
remain static and functional, just so long as the domain over which they
operate is permitted to grow. It seems plausible, instead, that these
challenges would call for modifications to the core content of our nationalist,
state-restraining values as well, or, at the very least, that these challenges
would spawn questions about state obligations with respect to federal law and
policy that might previously have been hidden from view or thought
unimportant.111
110

111

The Supreme Court confronted such a question not long before Wechsler penned his famous essay,
so it cannot be said that these issues were too hazy to identify or would come into focus only in the
distant future. Thus, in Testa v. Katt, the Court reversed a Rhode Island court’s determination that
it need not exercise jurisdiction over a claim arising under the Federal Emergency Price Control
Act. 330 U.S. 386, 388–89 (1947). The state court had held that it could not hear the claim because
it lacked jurisdiction to enforce the penal laws of a foreign sovereign. Id. at 388. The Supreme
Court, however, insisted that state courts of competent jurisdiction have a duty to participate in the
enforcement of federal law. Id. at 394.
Questions fitting this description would emerge as major battlegrounds in the law of federalism over
the latter part of the twentieth century. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72
(1996) (holding that Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity when legislating pursuant
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From this perspective, it is easier to perceive the choice—and the hint of
complacency—that inheres in Wechsler’s response to the mid-century
upheaval in the constitutional law of federalism. His article endeavors to
provide reassurance that the states would be just fine. It does not engage the
possibility that the nation might not be—that the nationalist advance
embodied in the constitutional law of the era might be in need of scaffolding.
In this way—and especially in light of the fantastic prominence the
safeguards theory would come to enjoy—Wechsler helped the national
power skeptics to set the agenda for a generation of federalism scholars. That
agenda treated the potential collapse of state autonomy, rather than the
fragility or future of our budding nationalism, as the central object of concern
for federalism scholars.
I do not mean this as a criticism of Wechsler, certainly not a sharp one.
He is entitled to his choice of subject, and it seems safe to say that any scholar
who publishes an article that sets the terms of debate within his field for half
a century has chosen his subject well. But the terrain over which debate
relating to the constitutional law of federalism takes place is now so
numbingly familiar—both in its fixation on the preservation of state
autonomy and on the matter of courts’ role in the preservation effort—as to
obscure the fact that Wechsler (and the generation of commentators that
followed him) could have chosen a different path—one that focused on the
consolidation, or even expansion, of the nationalist constitutional project.
B. The Complacency of New Nationalism
Further (and more recent) examples of complacency can be found in
academic literature that travels under the heading “new nationalism.” This
body of commentary is centered around the provocative claim that
(1) empowerment of states can help advance a range of goals that are
congenial to proponents of a strong central government,112 and so (2) self-

112

to its powers under Article I of the Constitution); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992) (“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal
regulatory program.”); Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 554 (1985)
(holding that the Tenth Amendment poses no obstacle to the application of the Fair Labor
Standards Act to state employees).
See, e.g., Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1893 (“[F]ederalism can be a tool for
improving national politics, strengthening a national polity, bettering national policymaking,
entrenching national norms, consolidating national policies, and increasing national power.”). One
can see from this passage that, like so many others, the new nationalists often use the term
“federalism” when they mean something closer to “devolution.” The claim that federalism,
properly understood, can achieve the things Gerken specifies here is consistent with the argument
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identified nationalists ought to scale back their general distrust of state
government and let go of their sometimes-reflexive aversion to state
empowerment.113 As Dean Gerken (the leading figure of the new nationalist
school) put it: “[A] committed nationalist ought to believe in federalism.”114
In defending and developing these claims, the new nationalists focus a
great deal of attention on the opportunities for state empowerment that are
presented by cooperative federalism schemes. The new nationalists
emphasize, in particular, that although states’ policymaking discretion is
typically limited in important ways when they participate in the
implementation of federal programs, it is also the case that states are able to
wield significant power while working within these cooperative
frameworks.115 This matters because it suggests that constitutionally
protected autonomy from the impositions of the federal government is not a
strict prerequisite to the exercise of real power by the states.116 And that, in
turn, means we might secure some of the benefits associated with the
devolutionary side of our federalism without taking on the risks (to national
values, institutions, and policies) that might follow from empowering states
through the device of constitutionally protected autonomy.117
Crucially, for our purposes, new nationalist enthusiasm for the exercise of
state power in the context of cooperative federalism schemes is not limited to

113

114
115

116

117

she develops in her article, but it is clear from context and from Gerken’s other work that the point
she wishes to drive home is that state empowerment (which is of course only half of what federalism
is about) can advance the nationalist goals she identifies. The terminological error is endemic to
the new nationalist literature. See, e.g., Heather K. Gerken, The Loyal Opposition, 123 YALE L.J. 1958,
1967 (2014) (“Federalism, of course, is the main competitor to nationalism . . . .”); see also Jessica
Bulman-Pozen, From Sovereignty and Process to Administration and Politics: The Afterlife of American
Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1920, 1923 (2014) (“Understanding ‘federalism as the new nationalism’
thus complicates both the ‘federalism’ and the ‘nationalism’ sides of the equation.” (footnote
omitted) (citing Gerkin, New Nationalism, supra note 10)).
See, e.g., Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890 (“It’s time for the nationalists, who have
often rebuked federalism’s proponents for being behind the times, to catch up to today’s realities.”);
Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963 (“Nationalists have a bad habit of conflating ‘Our Federalism’ with
your father’s federalism. . . . But federalism today is largely sheared of its traditional trappings.”).
Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890; see also id. at 1891 (“[F]ederalism’s ends . . . are
also nationalist ends.” (emphasis omitted)).
See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256,
1268 (2009) (observing that states often find “microspheres of autonomy” within cooperative
federalism programs).
See, e.g., id. at 1263 (“Scholars who endorse the normative position that states should serve as rivals
and challengers to the federal government largely miss the descriptive possibility that states can do
so even where they lack autonomy.”).
Id. at 1261–64; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1956 (“Lacking an autonomous realm of
action in critical areas, states nonetheless imbue federal law with diversity and competition . . . .”).
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instances in which state officials work dutifully within the limits set by federal
law to advance congressional policy. It extends, too, to circumstances in which
states take advantage of their roles as implementers and enforcers of federal law
to challenge, remodel, or even thwart national policy. Indeed, such exercises in
dissent lie at the core of new nationalist thinking about state empowerment.
This comes through most clearly in the work of Professor Bulman-Pozen and
Dean Gerken. In their co-authored article, Uncooperative Federalism, for example,
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken catalog the myriad ways in which states are able to
“resist federal mandates,”118 “challenge federal authority”119 and “contest
federal policy”120 when operating under the auspices of (supposedly)
cooperative governance schemes.121 States might do these things, the authors
explain, by exercising statutorily-granted discretion in a manner that deviates
from national policy, by engaging in regulatory gap-filling in ways that force
federal regulators to reconfigure national policy, or simply by declining to
enforce fragments of federal law with which they disagree.122
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken argue that this uncooperative behavior offers
a “distinct set of normative benefits”123 that “have not been fully
appreciated”124 by commentators. They argue, in particular, that it creates
opportunities for states to advance their own regulatory agendas, and even
enables state officials more effectively to wrest control of the national
policymaking agenda from federal officials.125 They take pains to build “the

118
119
120
121

122
123
124
125

Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1263.
Id.
Id. at 1288.
See id. at 1259 (noting that states are able to “tweak, challenge, and even dissent from federal law”
when exercising power within cooperative federalism schemes); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note
112, at 1934 (noting that when states participate in the administration of federal law, they are able
to “inject diversity, contestation, and a degree of chaos . . . into national governance”); Heather K.
Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, 62 DUKE L.J. 1349, 1373 (2013) [hereinafter Gerken, Exit, Voice,
and Disloyalty] (noting that the strongest forms of state contestation “involve genuine rebellion—a
deliberate effort to thwart federal law, or at least implement it in a manner plainly inconsistent with
the federal mandate”); Heather K. Gerken, Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down, 124 HARV. L. REV.
4, 65 (2010) [hereinafter Gerken, All the Way Down] (taking note of states’ capacity to “challenge,
thwart, even defy the decisions of the national majority” through their participation in federal-state
governance schemes); Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1558
(2012) [hereinafter Gerken, Our Federalism(s)] (discussing efforts by two states “to hijack federal welfare
policy, [by] creating model regimes that helped pull down federal policy from within”).
Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1271–80.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1260.
Id. at 1286–87, 1292–93; see also id. at 1284–94 (exploring an array of potential benefits associated
with uncooperative state behavior).
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normative case for valuing such resistance,”126 and they emphasize the
advantages uncooperative federalism offers relative to other vehicles for state
resistance to federal power and policy.127
It is hard to argue with the descriptive claims on offer here. In particular,
there can be no doubt that states are sometimes able to rely on their power
and discretion in connection with cooperative federalism programs to contest
and undermine federal policy. It seems likely, moreover, that these exercises
in dissent and pushback sometimes enable states to exercise greater control
over local, and even national, policy. But the difficult and important
question, I think, is not whether states’ role in the administration of federal
law affords them opportunities to mangle national policy and reshape it to
their liking. (Of course it does.) The question is whether these exercises in
dissent are, from the perspective of sound federalism and good governance,
cause for celebration or lament. It is whether the benefits of empowering
states in the ways identified by the new nationalists outweigh the costs.
When states “resist federal mandates” or “challenge federal authority,”
their actions raise a host of difficult questions sounding in national supremacy
and relating, more generally, to the mechanics of our federal system: At what
point does uncooperative state behavior run afoul of Article VI? Is it
consistent with the nationalist features of our Constitution for states to
attempt to “thwart [or] defy the decisions of the national majority?”128 When
is the introduction of “diversity, contestation, and . . . chaos”129 to the process
of national governance a welcome development, and when is it a worrisome
exercise in subverting the outcome of a hard-fought political battle? The
new nationalists do not say.
Bulman-Pozen and Gerken acknowledge that state pushback against
federal law and policy may not always be desirable.130 And on multiple
occasions—in Uncooperative Federalism and other work—they gesture at some
of the difficult questions teed up by their analyses. But in every instance, they
choose to explore “the possibilities”131 and “underappreciated benefits”132
associated with state dissent from federal law and policy and to leave those

126
127
128
129
130
131
132

Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1260, 1292; see also Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 121, at 1350 (taking note of
“the productive possibilities associated with the principal-agent problem” (emphasis omitted)).
Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 121, at 65.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1934.
See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1260.
Id. at 1258.
Id. at 1285.
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difficult questions for another day.133
It can be immensely valuable, of course, to call attention to possibilities
that have been overlooked by informed observers—to explore benefits not
yet considered and to demonstrate that they are real. But at some point it
becomes necessary actually to evaluate those possibilities—to assess the
asserted benefits alongside their potential costs. You cannot build a
compelling case while ignoring half the problem.
What, then, explains the new nationalists’ persistent neglect of the
questions flagged above? Why take such pains to build this “normative case”
while holding what appears to be the essential normative question in
abeyance? The answer, I think, is complacency. It is that the new
nationalists believe the problem they shunt aside so consistently is not really a
problem—certainly not a serious one.134 There are numerous signals to this
133

134

See, e.g., Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1077, 1081 n.7 (2014)
[hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism] (“Consideration of the many tradeoffs that inform
a complete normative assessment must await future work.”); Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note
115, at 1284–85 (“[T]here is a good deal more empirical and analytic work to be done before a
proper assessment of uncooperative federalism can be made . . . . We leave a full development of
these questions for future work.”); Heather K. Gerken, Dissenting by Deciding, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745,
1751 (2005) (“The purpose of the Article is simply to identify the benefits decisional dissent offers
and to provide a framework for identifying the tradeoffs and risks inherent in the choice to pursue
those benefits. . . . [I]t does not offer the sort of contextual details that would be necessary to decide
precisely when dissenting by deciding is a preferable strategy for institutionalizing dissent.”); id. at
1753 (“While I address some of these issues in this Article and elsewhere, I leave a full account of
these complexities for another day.” (footnotes omitted)); id. at 1798 (“Although the type of detailed,
contextual analysis necessary to make such a judgment is beyond the scope of this Article, this Part
offers some preliminary thoughts on the questions we would want to answer in making such
choices.”); Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 121, at 1377 (“My goal is to illuminate a set
of arguments that are too often excluded from the cost-benefit calculus, not do the math for you in
advance. . . . I thus won’t canvass the litany of grievances we conventionally associate with the
principal-agent problem.”); Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 121, at 71 (“While this Foreword
begins to identify a set of costs and benefits that have been overlooked in the debate thus far, it does
not provide a new scale for balancing them . . . .”); Gerken, supra note 112, at 1960–61 (“Proof of
[this Article’s central claim] cannot be fully canvassed in a short essay . . . . An essay, at best, can
raise questions.”); cf. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 459, 464 (2012) [hereinafter Bulman-Pozen, Federalism as a Safeguard] (discussing
federalism’s capacity to safeguard separation of powers values and “reserv[ing] a more complete,
normative assessment for future work”); id. at 463 (acknowledging that there are potential “costs
[to] state resistance” but declining to explore them).
In making this claim, I am doing something Dean Gerken specifically implored her readers not to
do. She wrote:
The risk in offering an affirmative account . . . is that the reader may eventually slip into
thinking that the author “really” thinks her new factors trump the well-known costs and
benefits we typically consider when deciding whether to devolve power. Please don’t. . . .
The point is not to do the math in advance, but simply to illuminate a set of arguments
that are too often excluded from the equation.
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effect in the new nationalist literature. In particular, there are hints that the
new nationalists believe state empowerment no longer poses a serious threat
to national policy or institutions. I explore and scrutinize these claims below.
1. Reimagining the “National”
One of the recurring themes in the new nationalist literature (especially
Professor Bulman-Pozen’s work) is the supposed collapse of the distinction
between that which is “state” and that which is “national.” This collapse is
attributed to two forces in particular. First, as cooperative governance
schemes are now a staple feature of the American regulatory landscape, the
contours of nominally federal regulatory programs are often established
through processes of lobbying, drafting, implementation, and oversight in
which states participate as both collaborators and independent actors.135
This means we no longer live in a world characterized by the rigid separation
of state- and nation-based regulatory domains. Instead “state and federal
governments,” Professor Bulman-Pozen explains, “together produce national
governance.”136
Second, it is increasingly the case that when states push back against the
exercise of national power, they are not motivated by interests that are
distinctive to any particular state or group of states, nor are they driven by a
general, theoretical, or institutionally-motivated commitment to the
preservation or expansion of state autonomy.137 Instead, when states
compete with the national government, or challenge the exercise of national
power, it is often the case that their goal is simply to advance the agenda and

135
136

137

Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note 121, at 11. At this point, however—which is to say, with more
than a decade gone by, and with the publication of more than half a dozen articles and essays
celebrating state-based dissent from national policy and touting devolution as a species of
nationalism—I think it fair for readers to assign exactly that view to the new nationalist school,
Gerken in particular. One cannot reasonably expect to play the role of provocateur—telling
nationalists they need to “put up or shut up,” Gerken, supra note 112, at 1962, and that they are
out of touch with reality, Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890—without owning the
substantive claims at the heart of the provocation.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1932.
Id. at 1922 (emphasis added); see also Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1101
(explaining that modern governance yields many policies that “are only ‘state’ or ‘national’ in the
sense of their site of enactment, not their purposes or intended audience”).
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1090 (“Party politics means that state
opposition need not be based on something essentially ‘state’ rather than ‘national.’”); id. at 1100
(“Depending on the particular question and the broader context, some states champion state
autonomy while others welcome national action. State status as such does not tell us when states
will make arguments sounding in sovereignty and oppose the federal government.”).
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interests of the political party that is out of power at the national level.138
These interests are held by individuals and groups spread across the country
and are championed by organizations and donor networks that operate on a
national scale.139 Accordingly, Bulman-Pozen concludes, states are properly
understood as a kind of national actor—they “participate in controversies that
are national in scope and do so on behalf of the nation’s people at large.”140
So far as the new nationalists are concerned, these dynamics require us to
reorient our thinking about the state/federal distinction. Thus, Bulman-Pozen
has argued that “state and national interests are one and the same,”141 that
“‘the national’ is not defined by Washington alone,”142 and that “it no longer
makes sense to focus on distinctive state and national interests.”143 Gerken,
meanwhile, has argued that “[s]tates now serve demonstrably national
ends,”144 that state empowerment “is a means to achieving a well-functioning
national democracy,”145 and that “[t]here is little point to valorizing categories
like ‘state’ and ‘national.’”146 As the cri du coeur of this developing school of
thought proclaims, federalism should not be regarded as antagonistic to
nationalism; rather it is nationalism, adapted to modern conditions.
Some caution is in order before evaluating these claims. I do not think
Professor Bulman-Pozen means to suggest that state and national interests
are always perfectly coextensive. And I do not take Dean Gerken’s delphic
138

139

140

141
142

143

144
145
146

Id. at 1090 (“[A]s Democratic and Republican politicians compete to gain power and implement
partisan agendas, federalism provides critical infrastructure for their conflict. . . . States governed
by the party out of power in Washington seek both to obstruct federal policy and also to challenge
it through affirmative acts.”).
See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1932–33 (“[S]tates facilitate competition between the
Democratic and Republican parties and offer staging grounds for national networks seeking to
further their agendas. . . . Instead of advancing particularistic commitments, states often give
concrete form to interests that exist throughout the nation . . . .”).
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1082; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at
1947 (explaining that state challenges to federal authority “advance one set of national interests against
another set of national interests, not state interests against national interests” (emphasis added)).
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1949.
Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1091; see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at
1933 (arguing that when states intervene in political disputes they “enable a variety of national
publics to emerge”).
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1947; see also id. at 1922 (“Taking administration and partisanship
seriously means we must acknowledge a certain incoherence to invoking state governance and
interests in opposition to federal governance and interests.”); Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism,
supra note 133, at 1090 (suggesting that states no longer represent “distinctively state interests against
the distinctively national interests of the federal government”).
Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1917.
Id. at 1893.
Id.
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admonition that we refrain from “valorizing” the categories “state” and
“national” to mean that those terms are, in her view, utterly useless to
students of American federalism. Instead, Gerken and Bulman-Pozen mean
to caution self-identified nationalists to discard the reflexive assumption that
state empowerment is inimical to nationalism and national interests. With
state and federal governance, as well as state and federal interests, now so
messily intertwined, the argument goes, it will often be the case that statebased pushback against federal law and policy can itself be classified as
“nationalist.”147 And why should the nationalist fear what is nationalist?
The new nationalists go awry here by eliding the distinction between
what is “national” and what is “nationalist.” It is sensible to characterize the
coordinated effort of a nationwide political party to advance a goal that is
shared by people scattered across the country as “national.” But we would
need to know more before we could venture a guess as to whether that effort
could properly be labeled “nationalist” as well.
For Bulman-Pozen, the appropriateness of the classification seems to turn
on the motivation for state behavior. So long as pushback against national
power or policy is not driven by a general, trans-substantive commitment to
devolution—so long as state officials do not “really” care about state power
and are only using state empowerment as a convenient tool to advance the
agenda of a nationwide political party—the term “nationalist” fits just fine.
But I am not sure why that should be. If you are a self-styled nationalist—
which is to say, if you are generally concerned about the consequences of
state empowerment, about impediments to the faithful implementation of
federal law and policy, and about the health and stability of national
institutions—what difference should it make why some state or state official
endeavors to undermine federal policy or power? An argument in favor of
state autonomy does not become nationalist just because it is pretextual (nor
because it has implications for political debates that are national in scope).
Curiously, this error—the conflation of “national” with “nationalist”—is
the mirror image of a well-known and significant flaw that numerous
commentators (Bulman-Pozen included) have identified with the famous
political safeguards theory. That theory, you will recall,148 posits that because
elected national officials are beholden to state-based electorates, they are
147

148

Bulman-Pozen, Partisan Federalism, supra note 133, at 1091 (explaining that party politics adds a
“nationalist dimension” to our federal system); see also Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1949–50
(“States’ critical role in staging partisan conflict concretizes the diversity of interests that may be
properly understood as ‘national.’”).
See supra text accompanying notes 100–02.
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unlikely to exercise power in ways that do violence to important state
interests. As Professor Bulman-Pozen has noted, however, “the[ ] structural
safeguards [identified by Wechsler] at best protected geographically
concentrated interests, not the autonomy of state institutions.”149 Wechsler,
in other words, identified reasons to believe that elected federal officials
would care to advance the interests of people living in their home states. But
that is different from advancing or preserving the power of the states
themselves, and federalism, of course (its devolutionary side, at least), is
concerned with the latter. The “nationalism” on display in Bulman-Pozen’s
work just runs this error in the opposite direction: It proceeds from the
premise that the promotion of geographically dispersed interests qualifies as
a species of nationalism, even if the effort diminishes the power of national
institutions or impedes the implementation of national policy. This is wrong.
To be clear, I do not doubt the new nationalists’ claim that devolution
(which they often confusingly label “federalism”) can serve nationalist ends.150
But it is a leap from that observation to the more sweeping assertions that lie
at the heart of the new nationalist school of thought: that “a committed
nationalist ought to believe in federalism,”151 that “federalism’s afterlife [is]
a form of nationalism,”152 or, indeed, that federalism (not just its “afterlife”)
is our modern-day nationalism. These claims make little sense if one is
committed only to the modest proposition that greater measures of
devolution and state-based pushback against the federal government might
occasionally yield outcomes that are congenial to nationalists. For the new
nationalists’ grander claims to hold water, one would have to believe that not
only can devolution serve nationalist ends, but that it does serve them—
regularly, predictably, and well. The new nationalists cannot, in my view,
defend this proposition simply by demonstrating that states now participate
in nationwide political controversies on behalf of nationwide constituencies
or work alongside federal lawmakers and officials in framing and
implementing federal law.

149

150

151
152

Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1925; see also Kramer, supra note 97, at 222 (noting that the
political safeguards theory conflates two different things: “ensuring that national lawmakers are
responsive to geographically narrow interests, and protecting the governance prerogatives of state
and local institutions,” and explaining that federalism is ultimately concerned with the latter, while
the safeguards theory speaks only to the former).
See Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1893 (“[F]ederalism can be a tool for improving
national politics, strengthening a national polity, bettering national policymaking, entrenching
national norms, consolidating national policies, and increasing national power.”).
Id. at 1890.
Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1956.
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2. Not Your Father’s Federalism
The new nationalists’ apparent confidence that increased levels of
devolution will serve nationalist ends, as well as their concomitant failure to
explore nationalist downsides to the species of state empowerment they
advocate, might be explained another way. In particular, one of the
motivating premises of new nationalist thinking about state empowerment is
that federalism today is quite different from what it was a generation (and
certainly two generations) ago. This is true, Dean Gerken explains, because
“[t]he sovereignty trump card wielded during the days of slavery and Jim
Crow cannot be played anymore,” and so the national government can find
a way to regulate states if it wants to.153 “The national government,” Gerken
insists, “can police federalism’s worst excesses . . . while taking advantage of
its best features.”154
Nationalists, Gerken argues, have been too slow to adapt to this reality.155
They remain in “the bad habit of conflating ‘Our Federalism’ with your
father’s federalism”156—which is to say nationalists continue to associate
federalism with “racism, parochialism, and cronyism,”157 and they still trade
in the decades-old intuition that “if ‘one disapproves of racism, one should
disapprove of federalism.’”158
Gerken regards this perspective as
“outdated.”159 Modern federalism, in her view, “is largely sheared of its
traditional trappings.”160
There are two things going on here, I think. First (and unmistakably),
Gerken is arguing that the hazards associated with state dissent from national
policy can typically be mitigated by the federal government at acceptable
cost. “All the national majority needs to do,” she explains, “is spend the
political capital necessary to [bring a dissenting state in line].”161 Second,
Gerken appears to be hinting that state violations of national laws, policies,
and norms are not likely, under modern conditions, to be all that troubling.

153
154
155
156
157
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Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963.
Id.
Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1890.
Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963.
Heather K. Gerken, Distinguished Scholar in Residence Lecture: A User’s Guide to Progressive Federalism, 45
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1087, 1087 (2017).
Id. at 1088 (quoting WILLIAM H. RIKER, FEDERALISM: ORIGIN, OPERATION, SIGNIFICANCE 155
(1964)).
Id.
Gerken, supra note 112, at 1963.
Gerken, Exit, Voice, and Disloyalty, supra note 121, at 1382.
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It is not 1963 anymore, she seems to intimate, and “uncooperative” state
behavior today is rather less worrisome than, say, George Wallace standing
in the schoolhouse door or Bull Connor’s men wielding firehoses. Those
images help constitute federalism’s “traditional trappings,” and Gerken’s
point is that they no longer match our reality. Thus, your father’s federalism
is the federalism of Jim Crow; yours is something more benign.
The basis for the first of these claims is that Congress now enjoys vast
regulatory power and can extend its reach into most any realm of human
activity and state policy.162 This, in turn, means that states cannot rely on
their status as sovereigns to escape the control of the national government.
And that means there is less cause to worry about the consequences of state
defiance of federal law or policy.
But I do not think things are quite so simple. To begin with, as Gerken
and Bulman-Pozen themselves emphasize, the mere fact that Congress has
the constitutional authority to enact some policy does not mean the federal
government possesses the tools necessary to enforce it effectively.163
Moreover, as Professor Clark and others have emphasized, enacting federal
law is no easy matter,164 as the legislative process is structured in a way that
enables political minorities to obstruct legislative change.165 Gerken’s breezy
assertion that “all the national majority needs to do” to overcome state
resistance “is spend the [necessary] political capital” papers over these
features of federal lawmaking and implementation.
But even if Gerken were right, and the national majority could typically
“rein in federalism’s worst excesses” by enacting whatever measures are
necessary to bring a defiant state to heel, it is far from clear that it should
have to. It is far from clear, that is, that we should prefer a world in which
states intermittently flout federal law or disrupt national policy, and the
national majority responds by expending the resources necessary to bring
162
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See Gerken, supra note 112, at 1992 (“Decentralization involves risks, particularly when it comes to
political and racial minorities. But those risks are more easily managed in today’s world, where
federalism is all but sheared of sovereignty. The national government is enormously powerful and
involved in virtually every dimension of state and local policy. It is more than capable of protecting
the members of our loyal opposition from members of our disloyal opposition.”).
See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1267 (“While the federal government may threaten
to administer a program itself if the state does not cede to its demands, its capacity to do so is often
limited, and the state may call Congress’s bluff.”); id. at 1268 (“Having taken on the states as
partners, the national government’s threat to exit becomes less credible. Moreover, the ongoing
success of the program may depend on a healthy level of reciprocity.”).
See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
Clark, supra note 53, at 1339–40 & n.89.
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them in line, to one in which states are zealous in their efforts to advance
federal law and policy (or at least scrupulous in their efforts not to undermine
it). Most of the exercises in dissent and defiance that the new nationalists
celebrate take place against the backdrop of identifiable federal law and
policy (else the behavior would not qualify as “dissent”);166 and it is difficult
to see why the price of state respect for such law and policy should be federal
officials’ expenditure of political capital above and beyond what was
necessary to bring that policy to life in the first place. It is true, as Gerken
notes, that state-based dissent can “provid[e] ‘the democratic churn
necessary for an ossified national system to move forward,’”167 but she fails
to address the risk that such dissent will churn our democratic system to a
pulp by exposing settled national norms to perpetual challenge.
Consider, in this vein, the rules that govern Supreme Court review of
state court judgments with respect to matters of federal law.168 Although the
Court lacks the capacity to police each and every state court error when it
comes to the adjudication of federal claims, one could plausibly argue that
the Justices are able to police those tribunals’ “worst excesses” along this
dimension. Still, I don’t see anyone clamoring for state courts to give short
shrift to Title VII claims or to under-deliver on Fourth Amendment
protections in hopes of sabotaging federal law and policy. (Or, at least, no
one is doing so on the ground that it makes for attractive federalism.) This is
true, moreover, despite the fact that, by going their own way, state courts
might advance some of the goals associated with the devolutionary side of
our federal scheme. At least since Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee169 was decided,
there has been widespread agreement that our federalism frowns upon such
things; and I see no reason to regard the uncooperative treatment of federal
law by state executive and legislative officials—for which the new nationalists
express considerable enthusiasm—more favorably than uncooperative
treatment of federal law by state judges.
It is harder to know what to say about the hints in the new nationalist
literature that “federalism’s worst excesses” under modern conditions just are
166

167
168
169

See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra note 115, at 1276 & n.64 (noting that states “forced the
EPA to back off of a strong regulatory position” by “resist[ing] the Clean Air Act’s requirement
that they create inspection and maintenance programs to monitor emissions,” and declining to
assess whether, in that particular instance or in general, we are better or worse off when states take
advantage of their leverage in this way).
Gerken, The New Nationalism, supra note 10, at 1895 (quoting Gerken, All the Way Down, supra note
121, at 10).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2012). State court adjudication of federal claims is probably the oldest and
most firmly entrenched species of cooperative federalism in the American system.
14 U.S. 304 (1816).
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not as bad as the ones the country confronted during prior generations. If this
is, in fact, part of what the new nationalists mean to intimate, the conclusion
does not follow from the premise. For even if it is true that modern-day state
defiance of national norms is neither so poisonous nor so subversive as the
racially-oriented defiance that characterized Jim Crow, it remains the case
that state empowerment and state defiance often continue to go hand-in-hand
with the subordination of unpopular local minorities (including racial
minorities) and politically disempowered groups. One need only consider, for
example, the raft of strict voter identification laws that have recently been
enacted by the states,170 or instances of flagrant state-based defiance of the
Supreme Court’s decision recognizing same-sex couples’ right to marry,171 to
see that this is so. If one is worried about this sort of thing—about the
likelihood that, even under modern conditions, devolution might enable the
170

171

See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-417 (West 2006) (requiring voters to present proper identification
at the polls); 2011 Wis. Sess. Laws 103 (codified as amended in scattered sections of WIS. STAT.)
(requiring voters to present approved photo identification in order to cast a ballot). To be sure,
there is dispute among jurists as to whether some of these voter identification (“ID”) laws in fact
have a disparate impact on minority voters within the meaning of Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act. See, e.g., Frank v. Walker, 17 F. Supp. 3d 837, 895–97 (E.D. Wis.), rev’d, 768 F.3d 744 (7th Cir.
2014). I am persuaded by the views expressed by Judge Posner in his opinion dissenting from the
denial of rehearing en banc in Frank v. Walker. There he noted that (1) “[t]here is only one
motivation for imposing burdens on voting that are ostensibly designed to discourage voterimpersonation fraud, if there is no actual danger of such fraud, and that is to discourage voting by
persons likely to vote against the party responsible for imposing the burdens,” and (2) “[u]nless
conservatives and liberals are masochists, promoting laws that hurt them, these laws must suppress
minority voting.” Frank v. Walker, 773 F.3d 783, 796–97 (7th Cir. 2014) (Posner, J., dissenting).
Dean Gerken’s passing mention of the debate surrounding voter ID laws is telling. Gerken
has argued that when states “dissent by deciding”—when they actually enact their dissenting
viewpoints into law rather than simply voicing disagreement with federal policy or trying to change
that policy through the federal legislative process—they create salient, attention-grabbing policy
conflicts that stimulate valuable public discussion of the relevant issues. Gerken, All the Way Down,
supra note 121, at 67. And she notes, by way of example, that “[d]isputes over vote[r] fraud
garnered a lot more attention once state legislatures started passing voter ID laws.” Gerken, supra
note 112, at 1979. But state voter ID laws did not call attention to long-simmering disputes relating
to voter fraud that had theretofore been invisible to the public. Rather, the enactment of these laws
gave rise to widespread conflict relating to the veracity of claims of voter fraud advanced by
supporters of these laws and claims of minority disenfranchisement advanced by their opponents.
See Alan Blinder, Top Alabama Judge Orders Halt to Same-Sex Marriage Licenses, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/07/us/top-alabama-judge-orders-halt-to-same-sexmarriage-licenses.html. Roy S. Moore, the Alabama Chief Justice who had instructed state probate
judges to defy the Supreme Court’s holding relating to same-sex marriage, was subsequently
suspended from the bench as a result of his actions. Id. And I do not doubt that, if state officials
had failed to step in, the federal courts would have. This particular example, then, is not
inconsistent with the new nationalists’ instinct that the federal government possesses the necessary
tools to bring defiant states in line. The question I am addressing just now, however, is whether we
still have cause to worry that state pushback against federal laws and norms is likely, still, to involve
especially troubling efforts to subordinate unpopular minorities.
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oppression of vulnerable local minorities or seriously impede the enforcement
of national law—then the federalism on offer in the new nationalist literature
does not look new at all, and it certainly does not look nationalist.
III. IMPLICATIONS
I turn now to the inevitable question: So what? Why does it matter (does
it matter?) that our constitutional discourse is neglectful of nationalism? I
answer (equally inevitably) with some general reflections on the skewing of
that discourse and some speculative thoughts about particular areas of legal
doctrine that might look different if we routinely treated nationalism as a
constitutional value capable of bearing real weight. My hope is that, if I have
persuaded readers that our constitutional discourse is, in fact, askew, others
will join me in the effort to determine how and where, exactly, an invigorated
nationalist jurisprudence might have bite.
A. De-constitutionalizing Nationalism: The Wages of Neglect
Federalism counts as an important constitutional value; there’s not much
doubt about that. There has been vigorous debate, since the earliest days of
the Republic, over the question of how, exactly, power is to be divided
between the national government and the states. And since the middle of
the twentieth century, courts and commentators have debated the question
of what role the federal judiciary ought to play in policing the limits of
national power. But there is consensus (or something very close to it) that
federalism—like equality, liberty, the separation of powers, and so on—is a
foundational constitutional value.
This has important consequences for how we talk and think about the
concept.172 It means one can argue that a statute is invalid on the ground
that it is inconsistent with the federal structure, or that some exercise of
power by a government official is unlawful because it upsets the balance of
power between the federal government and the states. It also makes it
sensible to argue that a statute ought to be construed one way or another so
as to avoid disruption to the federal system. Values that do not earn the label
“constitutional” typically cannot support arguments such as these. More
172

See Richard Primus, Unbundling Constitutionality, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1081, 1083 (2013)
(specifying an array of payoffs conventionally associated with attaching the label “constitutional” to
some rule but going on to challenge the assumption that there is a fixed set of attributes that
necessarily attach to concepts widely recognized as “constitutional”).
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generally (and more nebulously), to say that a given value is “constitutional”
is to assign to it a kind of fundamentality; it is a signal that our society is
especially committed to advancing the value in question.173
It would seem to matter a great deal, then, that the thing we call
“federalism”—the concept that we all agree bears constitutional weight—is
routinely described and deployed in a way that focuses only on devolution. To
do so is to de-constitutionalize nationalism and, thus, to weaken nationalism’s
capacity to exert force in the ways described above. Consider, in this vein, that
while we are all familiar with rules of statutory interpretation that are designed
to safeguard state power and autonomy,174 it is more difficult to identify their
nationalist counterparts. Similarly, while courts and commentators routinely
assess the constitutionality of federal legislation by considering whether it will
advance or inhibit our capacity to secure the benefits associated with
devolution,175 it is far less common for judges and scholars to consider the
benefits of centralization when performing that calculus.176
Indeed, it is not just that nationalism is often forgotten as a constitutional
value; it is treated, at times, as if it were at war with constitutional values.
Thus, when Dean Gerken tells us that “[f]ederalism . . . is the main
competitor to nationalism,”177 and Professor Bulman-Pozen describes
federalism and nationalism as opposite sides of an equation,178 they imply
that nationalism stands outside of and is, indeed, antagonistic to our
Constitution’s vision of government structure (since “federalism” is the label
we attach to that vision).179 Nationalism, on these accounts, might be the
stuff of political theory or, perhaps, social and economic exigency; but
173
174
175
176

177
178
179

See id. at 1081.
See supra Section I.A.
See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
This is not to say that consideration of the benefits associated with centralization is entirely absent
from our constitutional law. It does plenty of work, for example, in connection with dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (explaining
that some subjects “imperatively demand[ ] a single uniform rule, operating equally on the
commerce of the United States in every port” and that such subjects “may justly be said to . . .
require exclusive legislation by Congress”). It also does work in an array of cases relating to the
duties states owe one another. See Gil Seinfeld, Reflections on Comity in the Law of American Federalism,
90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1309, 1314–23 (2015) (surveying cases and commentary relating to the
Privileges and Immunities Clause, the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the Extradition Clause
and noting the emphasis on the union-reinforcing goals underlying these provisions). The point is
that the constitutional interest in centralization seems not to serve as a counterweight to the interest
in devolution when courts are called upon to assess the legitimacy of federal law.
Gerken, supra note 112, at 1967.
See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 112, at 1923.
See also Vázquez, supra note 58, at 1611 (noting that “the Constitution reflects a careful balance of
federalism and nationalism”).
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whatever it is, it is exogenous to our constitutional law.
B. Nationalist Jurisprudence
It is easy to say (and easy to see) that neglect for nationalism has important
consequences for how we talk and think about our federal system. It is a
harder thing to figure out just when that neglect has tangible consequences
for particular legal doctrines. I am inclined to think that the practical effect
of our failure fully to develop a constitutional law of nationalism is pervasive.
We are dealing here with the shape of foundational constitutional concepts,
and it is reasonable to think that most every question relating to the
constitutionally proper allocation of power between the federal government
and the states might look at least a little different if we were accustomed to
treating nationalism as a full partner to devolution in the pantheon of
constitutional values. In this Part, I briefly examine three areas in connection
with which this is especially likely to be true.
The obvious place to start is with the presumption against preemption,
which I examined in detail in Section I.A. The Supreme Court has justified
the presumption by reference to “federalism concerns” and to states’ status
as “independent sovereigns in our federal system.”180 But it should be clear
by now that claims such as these can only be the beginning, not the end, of
an argument about how to resolve ambiguities relating to the preemptive
reach of federal law.
What the Justices must be saying, if they are thinking about the matter
clearly, is that preemption raises “federalism concerns” not because
compromising state autonomy is necessarily problematic from a federalism
perspective, but because, under a contingent set of conditions that happen to
describe federal-state relations at this point in our history, there is reason to
fear that preemption, as a general matter, is either reflective of, or likely to
contribute to, some sort of constitutional pathology. Of course, if this is the
instinct motivating the presumption, it is one that requires defending. And
a compelling defense of that proposition requires careful attention to the
nationalist features of our constitutional order and, in particular, sensitivity
to the fact that an unduly narrow construction of federal law might raise a
“federalism concern[ ]” in its own right. That attention and sensitivity, we
have seen, is missing from the relevant case law and, in large part, from the
academic commentary as well.
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Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
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To be sure, it seems likely that anyone prepared to endorse the
presumption on grounds of some inchoate “federalism concern[ ]” will be
sympathetic to a narrower, potentially more nuanced argument that the
particular qualities of modern American federalism call for safeguards
against unnecessary or excessive preemption. To the extent that is true,
thrusting nationalism into the relevant discourse might not move the needle.
But it is not too much to hope, I think, that in the transition from a regime
that is justified by way of little-scrutinized, only-halfway-accurate assertions
about what our federalism just is, to one that confronts and grapples with the
dual character of federal systems, we might come to see some features of this
landscape in a new light.
A second set of cases that has been affected by our neglect of nationalism
is one I have elsewhere labeled the “jurisprudence of union.”181 As to this
body of case law, the problem is not so much that neglect of nationalism has
led the Court to craft doctrine that cannot be defended; it is that the defenses
proffered by the Court for the doctrine it has propounded are the wrong
ones. In other words, the limits of our imagination and vocabulary when it
comes to the nationalist features of our federal system have caused the Court
to eschew sound justifications for these pockets of doctrine in favor of
defenses that are transparently weak.
The best example comes from the case law relating to state courts’
obligation to adjudicate federal causes of action. Those cases hold that state
courts are required to entertain federal claims unless they have a “valid
excuse” for refusing to do so; and they specify, further, that a valid excuse is
one “reflect[ing] the concerns of power over the person and competence over
the subject matter.”182 This means that a state cannot close its courthouse
doors to a federal cause of action if those doors are open to similar causes of
action arising under state law, and that states cannot deprive their courts of
jurisdiction over a set of federal claims just because they disagree with the
underlying federal policy.183

181
182
183

See generally Gil Seinfeld, The Jurisprudence of Union, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085 (2014).
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729, 739 (2009) (quoting Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381 (1990)).
Id. at 739–41. Thus, a state family court could, without constitutional difficulty, refuse to hear a
Title VII claim (since, presumably, employment discrimination claims fall outside the subject
matter competence of the court). But a civil court of general jurisdiction could not do so, since
those courts presumably entertain employment discrimination claims that arise under state law
(thus making it impossible to argue that such cases fall outside the subject matter competence of the
court). Nor could a state legislature fence all employment discrimination claims (state and federal)
out of its courts on the ground that it thinks workplace discrimination ought not to be actionable.
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What is remarkable about the decisions that establish and develop these
rules is how poorly theorized they are. The Justices have repeatedly insisted
that states’ obligation to entertain federal causes of action derives from the
Supremacy Clause.184 They have explained, more specifically, that the
problem with state jurisdictional rules that run afoul of the doctrine of valid
excuse is that they “undermine federal law”185 and threaten to “nullify . . .
federal right[s].”186
As I have explained elsewhere, however, this
handwringing about the nullification or undermining of federal law is generally
unwarranted.187 When a federal claim is dismissed from state court for want
of jurisdiction, the plaintiff remains free to re-file in some other tribunal (most
likely a federal district court). And it is difficult to see how a jurisdictional rule
that poses no formal obstacle—and, in the vast majority of cases, no practical
obstacle—to the vindication of a plaintiff’s federal claim can be said to “nullify”
or “undermine” the federal law at issue. Hence, this important feature of our
federal system—state courts’ obligation to entertain federal causes of action—
has been justified in terms that are not up to the task.
A better justification for the limits on state jurisdictional autonomy
recognized in these cases would sound not in federal supremacy, but in a value
best described as “union.” The idea is that state courts’ duty to entertain
federal causes of action is not an expression of the subordinate status of state
law (or, more controversially, state governments), but an entailment of the
states’ decision to come together and form a single nation. It is an expression
of the idea that member states must take ownership of national law—that they
must treat federal law as something they are bound to, not just something they
are bound by.188 The case law gestures in this direction from time to time, but
the idea never receives sustained attention, and it plays second fiddle, at best,
to the supremacy-oriented claims outlined above.189
The Court’s reasoning in these cases (especially the most recent and
important case in this line190)—its instinct to reach for a dubious supremacybased justification when an account focused on union would make more
sense—reflects the narrowness of our thinking when it comes to the
184
185
186
187
188
189
190

See id. at 736; Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947).
Haywood, 556 U.S. at 739.
Id. at 736; see also id. at 741 n.8 (insisting that state court dismissal of federal causes of action
“burden[s]” and threatens to “thwart [the] enforcement” of federal causes of action).
Seinfeld, supra note 181, at 1094–97; see also Haywood, 556 U.S. at 766, 769 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Seinfeld, supra note 181, at 1103.
See id. at 1099–1105 (offering a detailed account of the role played by supremacy and union in the
case law relating to state courts’ obligation to entertain federal claims).
Haywood, 556 U.S. 729.
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nationalist side of our federalism.191 My point is not that the questions raised
by these different bodies of doctrine would all of a sudden seem
straightforward if only, instead of relying on ill-conceived claims about the
supremacy of federal law, we resolved to talk the talk of “union” (or perhaps
just “nationalism”). The question of how to strike the proper balance
between the interests in state autonomy and national empowerment would
remain and, in many instances, it would remain difficult. The point is that
these cases are an outgrowth (and a further example) of the phenomenon
explored in Parts I and II of this Article—they reflect our failure to explore
and develop the constitutional law of nationalism. Were we in the habit of
treating nationalism as an independent, multifarious, and weighty
constitutional consideration—were we accustomed to carefully considering
the benefits thought to flow from our status as a nation and the legal rules
necessary to secure those benefits—we would be better able to identify and
reason about the values at stake across these bodies of doctrine.
This is true, too, in connection with the case law recognizing limits on
Congress’s authority to commandeer state executive and legislative branch
officials. As is well known, in New York v. United States192 and Printz v. United
States,193 the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Federal Government may
neither issue directives requiring the States to address particular problems,
nor command the States’ officers . . . to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program.”194 The holdings in the two cases are grounded
squarely in considerations of federalism, yet neither majority opinion says
much of anything about the nationalist side of the balance.
To some extent, this is unremarkable. The statutes under review
compromised the autonomy of state officials, so of course the opinions focus
principally on considerations of state sovereignty. But the impression one
gets from reviewing these decisions is that constitutional nationalism is simply
what is left over after we identify the necessary scope of state sovereignty and
autonomy.195 We figure out, first, what powers and immunities the states
must have if they are to serve their constitutionally designated functions; and
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193
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As I have explained elsewhere, this is not an isolated event. The same dynamic—i.e. the tendency
to cram state-autonomy-constraining constitutional rules within the framework of supremacy—
plays out in other areas as well. Id. at 1105–16 (exploring a union-oriented justification for features
of the law of intergovernmental tax immunity and foreign affairs preemption).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 935; see also New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
See New York, 505 U.S. at 156–57.
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we determine the reach of federal power, and assess the legitimacy of federal
law, by reference to that vision.196 It seems, once again, that we could just as
easily run the analysis the other way. That is, we might inquire, first, what
powers Congress must have if the national government is to serve its intended
purposes, and then define the reach of national power (and the residual
sphere of state autonomy) in light of that calculus. We might, but (in these
cases, at least) we do not.197
To be sure, there is repeated mention in New York of Congress’s
constitutionally enumerated powers (the Commerce and Spending powers in
particular);198 and Printz offers token consideration of the Necessary and
Proper Clause as well.199 But while the devolutionary side of our federalism
is treated (in these opinions and so many others) as if it were greater than the
sum of its textual parts, the nationalist side is not. The opinions signal that
there is an idea of state sovereignty—a structural commitment that cannot
be reduced to any particular constitutional clause or group of clauses—that
is capable of driving the interpretation of federal law or even requiring its
invalidation. But there is no parallel conception of national power working
in these cases to prevent it.
Even the dissenting opinions in New York and Printz—which of course
reject the vision of federalism advanced by the majority—do not rely on an
affirmative vision of our constitutional nationalism to support the conclusions
they offer. Those opinions acknowledge the nationwide scope of the social
problems addressed by the statutes under review,200 and they insist that
196
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200

Id. at 157 (“The Tenth Amendment . . . directs us to determine . . . whether an incident of state
sovereignty is protected by a limitation on an Article I power.”). To be clear, I have no objection
to the notion that we ought to consider the consequences for state sovereignty of authorizing some
exercise of federal power. My objection is to our practice of treating that question as the only
relevant question from the perspective of our constitutional federalism. The New York Court reduces
“[t]he benefits of th[e] federal structure” to those associated with devolution and does not consider
the benefits associated with centralization. Id. (relying on Gregory v. Ashcroft and other canonical
sources for a catalog of the benefits associated with federalism despite those sources focusing only
on the benefits associated with devolution).
I am not objecting to the Court’s observation in New York that the question of whether some federal
statute falls within Congress’s enumerated powers is a mirror image of the question whether that
statute invades the sphere of state autonomy protected by the Tenth Amendment. Id. at 156. I am
objecting to the fact that, when the Court endeavors to determine the extent of national power and
state autonomy, it largely ignores the functional reasons for establishing a nation as opposed to a
loosely bound confederation like the one that prevailed prior to ratification of the Constitution.
See id. at 156–59.
Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24.
See id. at 939–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress “act[ed] on behalf of the people of
the entire Nation” in addressing a national “epidemic of gun violence” (internal quotation marks
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Congress’s enumerated powers are capacious enough to support the federal
government’s efforts.201 But they make no real effort to explain why our
Constitution confers the relevant powers on the national government. In
these opinions, too—and, again, in sharp contrast to the way judges across
the ideological spectrum reason about the devolutionary side of our
federalism—it is as if the enumerated powers live in isolation from one
another and bear no relationship to any holistic theory of when centralization
might be attractive and what it might be good for.202
CONCLUSION
Nationalism is a poorly understood, erratically invoked constitutional
value. It does work in cases relating to the dormant Commerce power, and
it forms part of the backdrop to cases that take an aggressive approach
toward federal preemption of state law, but in the many ways canvassed in
this Article, the concept is badly neglected. I suspect that, to one degree or
another, one of the points flagged in Part II—the notion that federalism
today is vastly different from what it was many years ago—underlies all the
varied species of neglect surveyed here. There is no doubt of the notion’s
truth, or of the importance of adapting our understanding and study of
federalism with the relevant differences fully in view. But with the vast

201

202

and citation omitted)); New York, 505 U.S. at 195 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“[T]he 1980 and 1985 statutes were enacted against a backdrop of national concern over the
availability of additional low-level radioactive waste disposal facilities.”); see also id. at 206 (“We face
a crisis of national proportions in the disposal of low-level radioactive waste . . . .”).
Printz, 521 U.S. at 941 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Article I, § 8, grants Congress the power to regulate
commerce among the States. . . . [T]here can be no question that that provision adequately supports
the regulation of commerce in handguns effected by the Brady Act.”); New York, 505 U.S. at 211
(White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“The notion that Congress does not have the
power to issue ‘a simple command to state governments to implement legislation enacted by
Congress’ is incorrect and unsound.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting id. at 176 (majority opinion)).
The closest we get to this is a two-paragraph section of Justice Stevens’s opinion in Printz that
emphasizes the states’ duty to treat federal law as their own. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 944 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). As I have explained elsewhere, this discussion is consistent with the notion that “union”
is an independent, nationalist value that exerts real force in our constitutional law. See Seinfeld,
supra note 181, at 1136 n.224. But the opinion does nothing to develop the idea. Indeed, it does
not discuss anything remotely resembling these terms, which actually tends to reinforce the notion
that this sort of thinking is so foreign to our constitutional discourse that the Justices do not even
recognize when they are doing it. Justice Breyer’s opinion in Printz, meanwhile, helpfully frames
the question presented as an exercise in “reconcil[ing] the practical need for a central authority
with the democratic virtues of more local control.” Printz, 521 U.S. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
So he at least acknowledges that there are general, practical considerations that militate in favor of
centralizing power. But that observation is about all we get out of his opinion on the subject.
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growth in federal regulatory power and activity over the years, and with the
passage of time since the excruciatingly ugly exercises of state power that
characterized Jim Crow, our thinking about constitutional nationalism has
fallen into a state of torpor.
The consequences of this neglect are uncertain. I have identified areas
of doctrine that seem to be warped by it, but I am inclined to think that
assessing consequences in these terms misses the point to some extent. It fails
to capture how deeply and pervasively this neglect shapes our thinking about
what federalism is. As I noted at the outset, law students, lawyers, judges,
and academic commentators now routinely use the term “federalism” as if it
were synonymous with “devolution.”203 Indeed the practice is so widespread
that it is tempting to suggest that, at this point, “federalism” just means “states’
rights” or “state empowerment,” since that is the way the term is used—
uncritically and more or less uncontroversially—by well-socialized lawyers.
If this is the case, then it is worth taking notice. For this is not federalism as
the new nationalism; it is federalism without nationalism. And that is a new
species of federalism indeed.

203

I suspect that the misconception is attributable not only to the dynamics described in this Article,
but to conservative legal thinkers’ successful appropriation of the term through the naming of The
Federalist Society. The group’s commitment to the preservation and promotion of state autonomy
has generated a powerful association between that commitment and the term “federalist,” thus
obscuring the two-sided nature of the governance model and constitutional concept that go by the
same name.

